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Abstract 
 This dissertation consists of two essays. In the first one I exploit geographic 
variation in the Medicare Home Health Care reimbursement rate that arose as a result 
of legislation passed in 1997 to identify the impact of government coverage of home 
health care visits on the living arrangements of older Medicare beneficiaries. I find 
that less generous reimbursement policies lead to a greater fraction of elderly living in 
shared living arrangements. My estimates imply that the law change had a large effect 
on shared living arrangements. One way to see this is to consider how the 
reimbursement change differentially affected living arrangements in the state that was 
most impacted by the law relative to the median state. My results imply that the law 
change caused the fraction of the elderly living in shared living arrangements to 
increase by 8 percent more in the most impacted state relative to the increase in the 
median state. 
 In the second essay of this dissertation I use the imposition of limits in 
reimbursement for Medicare Home Health Care introduced in 1997 to study changes 
in exit patterns of home health care agencies in California between 1994 and 2000. 
  
  
 When using piece-wise-constant Exponential hazard models estimated on the 
entire sample of providers, I find that the imposition of limits in reimbursement had a 
statistically significant effect on exit of home health care agencies in California. 
 When conducting the analysis separately for for-profit and not-for-profit 
providers, results obtained with the piece-wise-constant Exponential model indicate 
that the imposition of limits in reimbursement had a statistically significant effect on 
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 Chapter 1: Institutional Background 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 Population aging and increased prevalence of chronic health conditions 
among the elderly bring issues of long term care to the forefront in many developed 
countries. For example, in the United States between 1997 and 2004 the percentage of 
elderly 65 or older with a heart and circulatory condition increased from 64.5 to 67.7. 
Also, during the same period, the percentage of elderly with diabetes increased from 
13.1 to 17.1 and the percentage of those with arthritis/joint pain increased from 44.5 
to 50.6 (Freedman et al., 2006).1 The two essays in this dissertation focus on home 
health care, a form of long term care that receives a significant amount of government 
funding in many countries (OECD, 2005). For instance, public expenditure on home 
health care in 2002 as a percentage of the GDP was 0.3 in the Netherlands, 0.2 in 
Canada, 0.6 in Germany, 0.4 in Denmark and 0.09 in the United States.2 
 In this dissertation I focus on the United States, where reimbursement 
generosity for home health care services to the elderly through the Medicare program 
has varied over time, and address two issues. 
 The first essay examines whether informal care increases with a reduction in 
government funding for home health care, and the second essay looks at whether 
changed reimbursement generosity had a differential effect on exit patterns for  
                                                
1 The percentage of elderly with obesity in the same period increased from 16 to 21.6. 
2 Data for all countries except the United States are from www.oecd.org. For the United States I 
consider expenditure on Medicare Home Health taken from the Medicaid and Medicare Statistical 




for-profit and not-for-profit home health care providers. The periods examined are 
1988 to 2000 for the first essay and 1994 to 2000 for the second. This chapter 
presents the institutional background that frames the two essays in chapters 2 and 3.  
 
1.2 Background on Medicare and Medicare Home Health Care Reimbursement Change 
  Medicare was enacted by Congress in the United States in 1965 to meet the 
health insurance needs of the elderly and the disabled.  During the time period 
considered by this dissertation, Medicare consisted of three parts: hospital insurance, 
known as Part A, a supplementary medical insurance, known as part B, and a third part, 
known as Part C, that expanded beneficiaries options for participating in private-sector 
health care plans.3 Medicare Part A is provided automatically and free of charge to 
people 65 or older that are eligible to receive Social Security or Railroad Retirement 
Benefits,4 whether they are claiming these monthly benefits or not. Part A covers 
inpatient hospital care, short-term skilled nursing facilities services, hospice care, and 
home health care. 
  Medicare home health care consists of health care services provided in the 
home of eligible Medicare patients through periodic visits. More precisely, Medicare 
home care covers six health care services: skilled nursing, physical therapy, 
occupational therapy, speech therapy, medical social work and home health aid.5 In 
                                                
3 In January 2006, Medicare Part D went into effect that allowed seniors for the first time to enroll in a 
Medicare-sponsored prescription drug plan.  
4 Medicare does not cover only all elderly 65+ that are eligible to receive social security benefits. 
Through time Congress expanded eligibility also to other categories. For a more comprehensive 
description of coverage see Health Care Financing Administration (2000). 
5 According to the definition of occupations that is given by the Bureau of Labor Statistics at 
http://www.bls.gov/soc/soc_j0a0.htm, occupational therapists assess, plan, organize, and participate 
in rehabilitative programs that help restore vocational, homemaking, and daily living skills, as well as 




order to be eligible to receive Medicare home health care, Medicare beneficiaries need 
to be home-bound and in need of intermittent and part-time6 skilled nursing, 
occupational or speech therapy. Also, patients need to be under the care of a physician 
in charge of prescribing and periodically reviewing the plan of care. Home health 
agencies are the providers that furnish home health care visits. In order to receive 
Medicare certification and therefore be eligible to receive Medicare reimbursement for 
the visits provided, home health agencies need to fulfill a series of administrative 
requirements that are described in the next section and that have the purpose of assuring 
a minimum quality of service.   
  Home health agencies represent the agents that are directly impacted by any 
Medicare reimbursement change. Because of this, and in order to better frame the home 
health care environment that led to the reimbursement change focus of this dissertation, 
it is useful to describe the reimbursement mechanism in place before 1997 as well as 
the incentives it created.  
  The Medicare reimbursement mechanism that home health agencies were 
entitled to receive in the period before the policy change studied in this dissertation was 
set in 1989. Before 1989, Medicare home health care visits were subject to an annual 
                                                                                                                                      
in rehabilitative programs that improve mobility, relieve pain, increase strength, and decrease or 
prevent deformity of patients suffering from disease or injury. Speech therapists Assess and treat 
persons with speech, language, voice, and fluency disorders. May select alternative communication 
systems and teach their use. May perform research related to speech and language problems. Medical 
social workers, according to Stanford School of Medicine, (at this web-site: 
http://smysp.stanford.edu/students/profiles/med_social_worker.html) assist patients and their families 
with health-related problems and concerns. They lead support group discussions, help patients locate 
appropriate health care and other health services, and provide support to patients with serious or 
chronic illnesses. They help patients and their families find important resources they need to overcome 
unhealthy conditions such as child abuse, homelessness and drug abuse. They also help patients with 
finding legal resources and financial aid for paying for health services.  Home health aides performs 
personal care services, such as assistance with eating, bathing, and toileting; simple surgical dressing 
changes; assistance with certain medications; activities to support skilled therapy services; and routine 




limit and could be provided only after hospitalization. The rules enacted in 1989 
significantly changed the previous regulations by eliminating the post-hospitalization 
requirement and the limit to the annual number of visits per user. Each home health 
agency only faced a limit on the maximum reimbursement for each type of visit, with 
the most skilled visits reimbursed at a higher rate than the lower skilled ones. With this 
reimbursement scheme, each agency had the incentive to minimizing the intensity of 
care per visit and to increase the number of visits per patient. In fact, aggregate data 
show that the number of visits per beneficiary went from 1.14 in 1988 to 7.8 in 1996. 
  This increase in the number of visits per beneficiary was due to two factors. 
The first is represented by the increase in the average annual number of visits per user 
that went from 24 in 1988 to 74 in 1996. Moreover, without the requirement of 
providing services only after hospitalization, agencies could serve a larger population 
of Medicare beneficiaries. This led to an increase in the fraction of Medicare 
beneficiaries that used the service from 4.9 percent in 1988 to 10.7 percent in 1996. 
  The expansion in the provision of services since 1989 was accompanied by a 
skyrocketing increase in Medicare home health care expenditures that went from $1.94 
billion in 1988 to $16.76 billion in 1996.7 The average payment per Medicare 
beneficiary on Medicare home health care went from $72 in 1989 to $497 in 1996, and 
the payment per person served went from $1410 in 1989 to $4660 in 1996. The number 
of providers went from 5695 in 1990 to 10127 in 1996. This growth in such a short 
period of time was without precedent. 8  
                                                                                                                                      
6 Health Care Financing Administration, 2000. 
7 In nominal dollars.  





  This very quick and large growth in spending for Medicare home health care 
did not pass unnoticed and raised critiques of the generous reimbursement considered 
responsible for favoring abuses. In particular, because home health care was originally 
intended to furnish a skilled nursing service (Mortaugh et al., 2003), the critiques were 
exacerbated by the disproportionate increase in the percentage of personal care visits 
provided by home health aides.9 In fact, home health aides visits went from 33.6 
percent of all home health care visits in 1988 to 48.9 percent of all Medicare home 
health care visits in 1996.10 
   In the Balanced Budget Act (BBA), enacted by Congress 1997, there are 
provisions intended to impose a limit on the increasing expenditures on Medicare home 
health care. 11The change introduced by the law involved two steps. First, from 1997 to 
2000, an Interim Payment System (IPS) was established that put a cap on how much 
each home care agency would be reimbursed per patient per year.  The cap had two 
parts: 75 percent of the value was based on each agencys 1994 average per patient cost 
and 25 percent was based on the average per patient cost of the agencys census 
division.12  The second step started in October 2000 when the IPS was changed to the 
                                                
9 For a detailed description of the duties of home health care aides, See footnote 5. 
10 In 1988 nursing care visits account for 51.1 percent of all Medicare home care visits, and physical 
therapy represented 11.5 percent of the visits. The remaining disciplines accounted for 3.6 percent of 
the total number of visits. In 1996 nursing care accounted for 41.1 percent of the visits, physical 
therapy was 7.3 percent and the other disciplines were only 2.7 percent of the total number of visits. 
11 The BBA contains provisions on several aspects of the health care environment as well as provisions 
on other sectors. 
12 A Census division is a cluster of states. There are in total 10 Census divisions: the New England 
division  (Connecticut ,Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont), Middle 
Atlantic (New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania), the East North Central division (Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin ) the West North Central division (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota), the South Atlantic division (Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Maryland , North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia), the East South 
Central division (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee), the West South Central division 




Prospective Payment System (PPS) that is still in place. Under PPS, a home care 
agency receives a single payment for all items and services furnished during each   
60-day episode of care. The payment rate is based on the national average cost of 
providing care in 1997, not on actual home health agency cost. To account for 
differences in beneficiary needs, PPS reimbursements are adjusted from a base rate. 
  In this dissertation, I concentrate on the first change in reimbursement, the 
IPS. The per visit reimbursement limit stayed in place after the IPS was implemented, 
so providers continued to have the incentive to minimize the intensity of care provided 
during each visit. However, the imposition of an average per patient cap created new 
incentives that are formally modeled by McKnight (2004). The author shows that 
imposing a limit on average reimbursement per user creates the incentive for agencies 
not to treat patients with long-term care needs.  
  In line with the predictions of theory, there is empirical evidence (McKnight, 
2004, 2006) that the IPS caused a drop of 3.3 visits per Medicare beneficiary between 
1996 and 1999.13 With the average per patient visit cost of $63 in 1996, the value of the 
in-kind benefit that Medicare beneficiaries received after the policy change declined by 
$207. Because of the incentive to select relatively healthy patients, the decline in the 
number of visits per beneficiary should be due to both a decline in the fraction of 
Medicare beneficiaries that used the service and by a decline in the number of visits per 
user. In fact, the fraction of Medicare beneficiaries that used the service went from 10.7 
                                                                                                                                      
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming), the Pacific division (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, 
Washington). 
13 This number varies slightly depending on the specification chosen. It crucially relies on assuming 
that agencies facing a binding constraint after the Interim Payment System would exceed the cost limit 
by an average 12 percent. This number is taken from an estimate developed by the Health Care financing 




percent in 1996 to 8.5 percent in 1999. Also, between 1996 and 1999, the average 
number of visits per user went from 74 to 42. These downward trends in use were 
reflected in the decline in aggregate expenditure on Medicare home health care that 
went from $16.75 billion in 1996 to $7.93 billion in 1999. 14  
  However, somewhat surprisingly, McKnight (2006) does not find evidence 
indicating that the decline in the provision of Home Health Care had an adverse impact 
on the health of elderly Medicare beneficiaries, not even the frailest ones. Several 
health measures were used to investigate this possibility: mortality, Body Mass Index, 
difficulty with stooping or kneeling, lifting 10 pounds and walking 2-3 blocks 
(McKnight, 2004, 2006).  
  McKnights finding that home health care visits dropped substantially but the 
health of the elderly did not is puzzling. There are two possible explanations for this 
finding.  The first is that the health measures she uses may not be adequate to detect a 
change in overall health of the elderly.  The second is that, because informal care by 
friends or family members may be a reasonable substitute for part of the services 
covered by home health care, in particular home health aide services, it is possible that 
the elderly were able to substitute enough toward informal care to prevent measurable 
adverse health outcomes.15  To further support this second hypothesis, it is worth 
recalling that home health aide visits, the type of visits that can be considered the most 
direct substitute of informal care, represented 48.9 percent of the total number of visits 
in the pre policy period. Moreover, home health aides visits were the ones that 
                                                                                                                                      
results that uses the cross state measure of reimbursement generosity developed by McKnight (2004) and 
explained in chapter 2. 




experienced the largest drop, representing only 34.3 percent of the total number of 
home health visits in 1999.   
  Theories of altruism as well as bargaining models of family decision making 
(Light and McGarry, 2003) suggest that informal care should increase when formal care 
does not meet the needs of the elderly. More specifically, in models of altruism 
childrens utility function is increasing in elderly parents well being, suggesting that 
the children should increase their transfers to the elderly facing adverse shocks. 
Bargaining models (Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Pezzin, Pollack and Schone, 
2006), on the other hand, suggest that children are willing to increase informal care if 
induced to do so by increased transfers from the elderly. Chapter 2 tests whether 
informal care substitutes for formal home health care by examining whether the 
imposition of limits in reimbursement for Medicare home health care introduced by the 
BBA caused an increase in fraction of elderly that live with other relatives or with 
friends rather than living alone or with a spouse.  
 
1.3  Certification of Medicare Home Health Care Agencies 
 According to the Social Security Act,16 Medicare home health agencies may 
be public agencies or private organizations (or a subdivision of those) that provide 
part-time or intermittent skilled nursing services and at least one other therapeutic 
service (e.g. physical, speech or occupational therapy, medical social service or home 
health aide services) at the recipients home. The home care services are provided 
under the care of a physician that should review the plan of care at lest every 62 days 
                                                                                                                                      
15 Another possibility is that measures of health, other than those measured by McKnight (2004, 2006), 




(Harrington et al., 1999). Besides these basic requirements, home health agencies 
must satisfy additional criteria in order to be eligible to obtain Medicare certification. 
These additional requirements can be grouped as follows: those pertaining to the 
organizational structure; those related to the agencys operations; and those concerned 
with the personnel policies and personnel qualifications. Furthermore, during regular 
surveys conducted by the Medicare program, the agency must disclose ownership and 
management information and update this information every time there is a change in 
ownership or management.  
 With regard to its organization, since each home health care agency can 
operate through multiple branches, the law requires that all the administrative records 
of the branches must be maintained by the parent organization. The home health 
agency also needs to have established a group of professional personnel in an 
advisory function on issues related to the services provided by the agency. The group 
includes a physician, a registered nurse and professionals from the appropriate 
disciplines pertaining to the services provided by the agency.  
 The regulations related to the operation of the home health agency are about 
patients rights. The agency is required to provide each patient with a written notice 
of rights and must advise the patient of record disclosure policies and procedures. In 
addition, the agency is required to inform the patient about the care plan in advance as 
well as any ensuing changes to it. 
 Closer scrutiny of the laws regarding the acceptance of patients and their plan 
of care reveals that patients should be accepted into an agencys client list on the 
basis of reasonable expectations that patients needs can be met at home. This last 
                                                                                                                                      




requirement may have unintended consequences, because, on the basis of it, an 
agency could refuse the most disabled and chronic patients, who, after 1997, were 
also the least profitable ones to treat.  
 The rules related to personnel policies and qualifications require that all the 
personnel in an agency must meet qualification requirements in the state in which the 
agency operates and must be licensed by the state. While this may seem obvious for 
personnel furnishing skilled nursing services or the other therapeutic disciplines 
covered by Medicare, the law also requires that home health aides, mostly involved 
with personal care services, undergo training set up at the state level. The training 
must last at least 75 hours and must cover specific subject areas such as reading and 
recording temperature, pulse and respiration, basic infection control procedures, 
maintenance of a clean, safe and healthy environment, safe transfer techniques and 
ambulation.17  
 Medicare certification is assigned to a home health care agency after the 
agency has been surveyed and found to be compliant with the regulations. A home 
health agency is supposed to be periodically resurveyed and may lose its certification 
if found not to be compliant with one or more conditions of participation in the 
Medicare program. If surveyors find that a home health agency is not compliant and 
its deficiencies are considered to be at risk of jeopardizing patients health, the 
regulations require that an agency follow a fast termination process. In the case where 
non-compliance pertains to less serious deficiencies, the agency follows a 90-days 
termination procedure. However, closure can ultimately be avoided by submitting a 




 Besides the above mentioned requirements, there are no further obstacles to 
obtaining certification as a home health care agency. Until 1997 the regulations did 
not even require that the owners of home health care agencies have previous health 
care experience and, perhaps more surprisingly, even people with criminal 
backgrounds could open a home health care agency, provided that their previous 
criminal activity was not related to Medicare or other federal health programs or 
illicit drugs (Gao, 1997). Certification is not only quite easy to acquire, but it is also 
rather difficult to lose. In fact, in fiscal years 1994, 1995 and 1996 about 3 percent of 
Medicare home health care certified agencies discontinued certification, for the most 
part because of closures or mergers. Terminations occurring as a result of deficiencies 
identified during the surveys were between 0.1 and 0.3 percent of all terminations 
from 1994 to 1996 (Gao, 1997). 
 The other aspect of the legislation that is particularly relevant for this 
dissertation is the rule regarding the adjustment across localities of Medicare 
payments to home health agencies. These adjustments take into account the 
differences in wages across areas. For example, because urban areas tend to have 
higher wages compared to rural ones, the baseline Medicare payment for a specific 
service is multiplied by an adjustment index that reflects the different compensation 
levels across urban and rural areas. Also, since different urban areas have different 
wages, the adjustment index across cities varies. For example, for agencies in San 
Francisco the upward adjustment to the baseline Medicare payment for a given 
service is higher than the one for agencies based in Atlanta, because the wages in San 
Francisco are higher. This rule implies that two agencies that locate in the same 
                                                                                                                                      




geographic area as defined by the reimbursement adjustment index receive the same 
reimbursement for each type of service provided. 
 This rule, together with evidence suggesting that home health care agencies 
that are Medicare certified provide a substantial fraction of their services to Medicare 
patients and therefore receive most of their revenues from Medicare,18 allows me to 
reasonably identify the market in which an agency operates using the geographic 
areas corresponding to different adjustment indexes. In fact, it seems quite plausible 
to imagine that agencies that are located in the same area for reimbursement purposes 
might share similar unobservable characteristics that are correlated with their location 
choice.  
 As a final note related to the adjustment of payments across localities, I must 
mention that prior to the BBA the adjustment index was based on where an agency 
was located, but after the BBA the adjustment index has been based on where the 
patients visited by the agency reside. This change does not seem to alter the 
plausibility of the choice of the market where an agency operates as the market in 
which the agency was located before the policy change. In fact, it is reasonable to 
imagine that two agencies that located in a market with the same adjustment index in 
the years before the policy change will likely keep on sharing the same unobservable 




                                                
18 For example, Medicare certified agencies in California in 1994 were providing 84 percent of their 





Chapter 2: Changing the Way the Elderly Live: Evidence from 






2.1 Introduction   
  Large fractions of the elderly populations of many developed countries live in 
"shared living arrangements", where they live with other relatives or with friends rather 
than living alone or with a spouse (See Table 2.1). One of the most common 
explanations for sharing living arrangements at old age is a decline in health that leads 
the elderly to increasingly rely upon regular care.   
 Table 2.1 shows large cross country variation in the fraction of older individuals 
that live in shared living arrangements. Several factors might explain these differences, 
including diverse cultural norms associated with intergenerational living arrangements 
(UN, 2005). Moreover, Table 2.1 shows that there is a negative relationship between 
the fraction of elderly that live in shared living arrangements and the share of resources 
that a country devotes to home health care services. This evidence seems to suggest that 
formal home health care may substitute, at least in part, for informal care provided by 
family members and friends and might be responsible for allowing a larger fraction of 
the elderly population to live independently. Establishing a causal relationship between 
the provision of formal and informal care is important because government support for 
home health care is expensive (Table 2.1), and population aging has raised policy 




and about the consequences of home care for outcomes like labor supply (Herrera et al., 
2003, OECD, 2005).  
 This paper provides an estimate of the substitutability between formal and 
informal care. More specifically, I examine the impact of the sharp decline in the 
provision of formal home health care, which resulted from the change in Medicare 
home care reimbursement, on the fraction of elderly in the United States that live in 
shared living arrangements. In principle, changes in formal home health care can 
impact the provision of informal care without varying living arrangements, but this is 
very difficult to measure empirically.19 Moreover, it is presumably easier and less 
expensive to provide informal care if the elderly person needing care lives under the 
same roof as their informal caregivers.  
 Therefore, I focus here on examining the causal relationship between the 
provision of formal home health care and the fraction of elderly living in a shared living 
arrangement as one dimension of substituting between formal and informal care.  To 
investigate the impact of the Medicare reimbursement change on the fraction of older 
Medicare beneficiaries living in shared living arrangements, I use the policy change 
introduced in 1997, which imposed a cap on the average reimbursement per patient that 
home care agencies were entitled to receive when treating elderly Medicare patients. 
The cap was based on a blend of each home health agencys average per patient cost in 
1994 and the average per patient cost of home health agencies in the agencys census 
division. Because the cap had a regional component, even states with similar pre-policy 
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caregivers how many hours of informal care they provide. It seems to me that this variable is likely to 





utilization potentially faced different restrictive reimbursement limits depending on 
their utilization relative to the average utilization in their census division. For example, 
agencies in Georgia and Oklahoma provided similar average amounts of care to their 
users before 1997, but agencies in Georgia faced a more restrictive cap as a result of the 
1997 change than did agencies in Oklahoma, because the regional average per patient 
cost in the South Atlantic census division prior to the law change was lower than the 
regional average in the West South Central census division.20  
 The peculiar reimbursement mechanism introduced by the policy change allows 
me to exploit the variation across time and across states to estimate a reduced-form 
equation and identify the impact of the cap on the fraction of the elderly that live in a 
shared living arrangement. By relying on an exogenous source of variation in 
reimbursements this study improves upon the previous literature that used potentially 
endogenous policies (Hoeger, Picone and Sloan, 1997; Coyte and Stabile, 2001) 
targeted towards selected populations of elderly (Applebaum, 1988). To my knowledge, 
this is first study that uses a quasi-experiment to estimate the impact of home care 
policies on living arrangements by looking at all of the non-institutionalized population 
of elderly in a country.  
 In the last part of this chapter, I combine my reduced form estimate and 
McKnights (2004, 2006) estimate of the impact of the reimbursement change on the 
number of Medicare home health care visits received by Medicare beneficiaries to 
provide a structural estimate of the impact of the number of Medicare home care visits 
on the fraction of older Medicare beneficiaries that live in shared living arrangements.   
 
                                                




2.2 Literature Review 
 A number of papers by economists have attempted to study the role that  
in-kind benefits in the form of home care play in the choice of living arrangement. 
Probably the most comprehensive study using non experimental evidence is the one by 
Hoerger, Picone and Sloan (1996) that used data from the National Long Term care 
Survey conducted by the Census Bureau in 1989 on a population of elderly that needed 
help in one of more activities of daily living. 21 Both elderly in the community and 
those residing in institutions were part of the sample. The authors had information on 
Medicaid eligibility subsidies, number of nursing home beds, state subsidies of formal 
care in the community and public cash payments to relatives and friends for care giving 
at a single point in time. They used a multinomial probit model to estimate the impact 
of the state policies on the probability that a disabled elderly person lives 
independently, in an intergenerational household, or enters a nursing home. When 
considering home health care, the authors find that the availability of local Medicaid22 
subsidies for home health care had no effect on nursing home entrance, while it 
increased the probability that elderly live independently. 
  Although the paper is very detailed, it also contains some limitations. Two 
points are worth noting. First of all, Medicaid home health care is available only to 
selected poor elderly. Therefore, findings for this group cannot be generalized to all the 
population of older individuals. Moreover, the study focuses on a reimbursement policy 
that is a function of unobservable characteristics of the elderly that likely impact their 
living arrangements. More specifically, Medicaid home and community based services 
                                                
21 Activities of daily living include bathing, dressing, toileting, transferring and eating. 




are in part financed by state resources and thus are dependent on resource availability 
and not just medical needs. In fact, there is big variation in the level of physical 
impairment required to be considered eligible to receive Medicaid home and 
community based services. It follows that, if beneficiaries in richer states are also 
healthier on average than beneficiaries in poorer states, the finding that higher 
expenditures are associated with a higher percentage of elderly living independently 
might be due to the selection of healthier individuals into richer states rather than to the 
home care benefit itself. 
  A more recent paper using Canadian data by Coyte and Stabile (2001) looks at 
the impact of publicly-provided home care benefits on informal care using repeated 
cross sections, but the impact on living arrangements is not studied. The reliance on 
comparing different Canadian provinces that self-select the level of care provided 
makes the paper subject to the same criticism as Hoerger, Picone and Sloan (1996). 
When looking at papers using experimental evidence, most studies rely on the National 
Long Term Care (Channeling) Demonstration Project financed by the Department of 
Health and Human Services in the 1980s.  The goal of Channeling was to see whether 
home and community based services could be a cost effective alternative to 
institutionalization. The sample included individuals that were at least 65 years old and 
particularly frail. The average age was 79 and most of the participants in Channeling 
had multiple functional limitations. Moreover, 19 percent of the sample needed help 
with all activities of daily living. People that took part in the experiment were also 




limited funding and a financial intervention that substantially expanded the set of 
home care services provided. 
  Christianson (1988) compares sample means and for the financial 
intervention finds that a 5 percent increase in the percent receiving in-home formal 
services was associated with a 1 percent point decrease in the percent receiving any 
informal care. Housework/laundry/shopping services, meal preparation and personal 
care were the measures of informal home care used to carry out the analysis. Pezzin, 
Kemper and Reschovsky (1996) used an ordered probit model on the data from 
Channeling and found that the financial intervention increased the probability of living 
alone for an unmarried individual by 7.1 percentage points. 
  The main criticism these studies are subject to is that the subpopulation 
studied was particularly frail, even when considering a subpopulation of elderly at the 
national level with the same functional limitations typical of Channeling participants.  
In particular, by using the National Long Term Care Survey, it has been shown that on 
a national level, elderly that would have met Channeling functional limitation criteria 
were much less likely than Channeling participants to live alone (Applebaum, 1988).  
Therefore, if Channeling participants were also less likely to change their living 
arrangements than a population of similarly impaired individuals at the national level, it 








2.3 Empirical Framework 
2.3.1 A Measure that Captures the Cross-State Variation Introduced by the Balanced 
Budget Act 
  After the policy change introduced by the BBA in 1997, in all 50 states the 
fraction of Medicare beneficiaries receiving Medicare home health care decreased 
sharply, and the average number of yearly visits per user plummeted. 
  In this chapter, the outcome variable of interest is the fraction of elderly 
Medicare beneficiaries 65 years of age or older that live in shared living arrangements, 
i.e. that live with somebody else besides the spouse if married or with somebody else if 
unmarried.23 In the empirical model outlined in the next section, the time series 
component of the decline in the number of visits per beneficiary after the policy change 
is captured by inserting year dummies in the equation that models the impact of the IPS 
on the fraction of elderly that live in a shared living arrangement. 
  However, the peculiar way the BBA defines the new reimbursement scheme 
can be used to construct a measure that captures a cross-state component of the 
variation implied by the IPS. McKnight (2004, 2006) constructs this measure to 
identify the impact of the IPS introduced in 1997 by the BBA on the number of 
Medicare home care visits received by Medicare beneficiaries. 
  Here, I use the same measure to identify the impact of the IPS on the fraction 
of elderly Medicare beneficiaries that live in shared living arrangements. 
  The measure can be constructed by noticing that the census division 
component of the per-patient limit creates exogenous cross-agency variation. This can 
                                                




be seen by considering two agencies: one that has an average per patient cost in 1994 
above the average per patient cost in its census division and another that has a  
per patient cost in 1994 below the average per patient cost in its census division. 
Because part of the reimbursement limit is based on the census division utilization, the 
first agency faces a more restrictive constraint. 
  It is worth stressing that, because of the generalized increase in the provision 
of services between 1994 and 1997, it is likely that the limit is restrictive also for the 
second agency, despite that its average per patient cost of treating Medicare patients is 
below the average per patient cost of treating patients in its census division. 
  Ideally, in order to be able to use this cross-agency variation introduced by the 
reimbursement mechanism, I would need to have access to information on cost at the 
single agency level. Unfortunately, as McKnight (2004, 2006), I do not have access to 
these data. Instead, I have access to Medicare home health care utilization data 
aggregated at the state and census division level. With these data, I follow McKnights 
(2004, 2006) suggestion that the reasoning applied to individual agencies should be 
valid, on average, when aggregating data at the state level. Therefore, with similar 
increasing trends between 1994 and 1997, states where aggregate home health agencies 
have below census division average per patient cost in 1994 face a limit in 
reimbursement that is less restrictive than the limit faced by states where, on average, 
the average per patient cost in 1994 is above the average per patient cost in their census 
division. 




cross-state variation in reimbursement I need to use a measure of cost. Here I follow 
McKnight and identify the average number of visits per user as the most appropriate 
measure of cost to use.24 More formally, McKnight (2004, 2006) defines the following 
measure of restriction in reimbursement generosity: 
 (1) Restrictivenesssc = ĀS- ĀC 
where ĀS is the average number of Medicare home care visits per user in 1994 in state 
s and ĀC  is the average number of Medicare home care visits per user in 1994 in state 
s s census division. The restrictiveness measure is between -40.9 (Kentucky) and 
34.7 (Utah). For example, Figure 2.1 shows the cross-state measure of variation for 
the Mountain census division and the South Atlantic census division, two census 
divisions that have a particularly large number of states. Figure 2.1 shows that in both 
census divisions in 1994 there were states that had an average number of visits per 
user above (the states with a positive number) and below (the states with a negative 
number) the average number of visits per user in their census division. 25  
  Was the cap imposed by the IPS restrictive for those states with a negative 
Restrictivenesssc? There are two reasons to think that this was indeed the case. First, the 
cap imposed by the IPS was based upon utilization levels in 1994 and between 1994 
and 1997 there was a generalized increase in average Medicare home health care 
utilization even in states with a negative measure. To better illustrate this point, I 
constructed the cap for all states and compare utilization levels in each state in 1996 
                                                
24 The reasons are due to the functioning of the indexing of the Medicare reimbursement across different 
localities. Appendix I goes in more in detail in explaining why the average number of visits per user has 
been used here. 
25 In all census divisions there are states with an average number of visits per user in 1994 above and 




with the cap. There are 33 states with a negative Restrictivenesssc measure. Only 9 of 
these in 1996 were providing an average number of visits below the cap. 
  However, it is very likely that the cap was binding also in these 9 states, because 
the cap is based on average utilization levels in each state. An example might be useful to 
illustrate this point. I consider a hypothetical state, state s. For simplicity, I assume that 
state s is in a census division that in 1994 was providing, on average, 25 visits per user. I 
also assume that in state s there are only three agencies that are treating the same number 
of patients. I suppose that in 1994 the three agencies provided 10, 20 and 30 visits per 
patient, respectively, for an average of 20 visits per patient. I also assume that the three 
agencies in 1996 provided 12, 22 and 32, visits per patient, respectively, an average of 22 
visits per patients in the state in 1996. The average restrictiveness measure in this state is 
-5.  The maximum reimbursement limit implied by the cap for these three agencies in 
state s is 13.75, 21.25, 28.75,26 respectively, an average of 21.25 visits per patient in the 
state. Therefore, even if, on average, the cap is not binding, one agency is constrained and 
has to comply with the cap by decreasing the number of visits per patient. All else equal, 
the result of the compliance with the cap is going to be a decline in the average number of 
visits per patient in the post policy period in state s.  
  Unfortunately, I do not have data at the state level that allow me to verify that in 
every state with a negative restrictiveness measure and with average utilization levels in 
1996 below the caps there were constrained agencies. There are two facts that support the 
idea that this was the case. First of all, after the policy change in all states (included the 9 
states that on average did not find the cap binding) there was a decline in the number of 




idea that constrained agencies had to comply with the cap by reducing the average 
number of visits per user. Second, even if the cap was, on average, below utilization 
levels in 1996, average utilization levels were really close to the limit. For example, 
utilization levels in 1996 in Oregon were 4.9 visits below the cap, those in Montana were 
1.6 visits below the cap, etc.27  So it seems plausible to assume the existence of providers 
constrained by the cap. This suggests that in those states where average number of visits 
per user in 1996 was above the cap restricted providers had the largest share of the 
market,28 whereas in those states where the average number of visits per user in 1996 was 
below the cap the constrained providers were those with the smaller share of the market. 
  I illustrate both the cross state component and the time series component of the 
policy change in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, figures that are similar to McKnights (2004, 2006) 
graphs. To construct the Figures, I divided states in three groups based on the 
restrictiveness measure implied by Equation 1. States identified as low restricted states 
are states that have the lowest measure of restriction and where about 20% of the total 
population lives. States identified as high restricted states are those with the highest 
measure of restriction as defined by Equation 1 and where about 20% of the total 
population lives.29 The remaining states are defined as medium restricted states. 
  Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show four facts. First, as previously discussed, in all states 
there was an increase in Medicare home health care utilization between 1994 and 1997. 
Moreover, the trends over this period were very similar in the three types of states. 
                                                                                                                                      
26 0.75*10+0.25*25=13.75, 0.75*20+0.25*25=21.25, 0.75*30+0.25*25= 28.75. 
27 The other states are: Nevada, 2 visits below the cap, Arkansas 3.5 visits below the cap, Kentucky 5 
visits below the cap, Maryland 7 visits below the cap, North Carolina 4.2 visits below the cap and 
South Carolina 1.3 visits below the cap. 
28 In fact, it is plausible to imagine that even in the states where the average number of visits per user 




Also, all states experienced a decline in utilization in the post policy period. Finally, the 
drop in visits per user and the drop in the number of users per 1,000 Medicare 
beneficiaries in the post policy period are much more severe for the high restricted 
states. 30  The graphs are an approximate visual representation of the estimation strategy 
used by McKnight (2004, 2006) to study the impact of the Interim Payment System on 
the number of home care visits received by Medicare beneficiaries. This strategy is 
illustrated in more in detail in the next section. 
 
2.3.2 Structural Framework 
  This section outlines the 3 equations that form the empirical framework of this 
paper. The first equation looks at the impact of the number of home health care visits 
on the fraction of elderly living in shared living arrangements (structural equation). The 
second equation, estimated by McKnight (2004, 2006), models the impact of the 
reimbursement change on the number of home health care visits received by Medicare 
beneficiaries (first stage equation). Finally, the reduced form equation, the main focus 
of this paper, estimates the impact of the reimbursement change on the fraction of 
elderly Medicare beneficiaries that live in shared living arrangements. 
  More formally, the first equation, the structural equation, in its baseline 
specification can be written as: 
y ist= c1+c2 n ist  +c3State s + c4Yeart +ε ist                                                       (2) 
                                                                                                                                      
29 On average, according to March CPS data, during 1988-2001. A description of CPS data is provided 
in section 2.4.  
30 The hypothesis of absence of differential trends in visits has been addressed more formally by 




where y ist is a dummy equal to 1 when individual i in state s in year t lives in a shared 
living arrangement (Gruber, Engelhardt and Perry, 2005) . The definition of shared 
living arrangement for a married couple captures situations in which both spouses are 
frail enough that after the BBA they need to substitute the decline in the provision of  
Medicare home health care services with informal care provided by somebody that 
lives with them. My data do not allow me to identify married couples in this situation, 
so that I have to keep in my sample all married couples of elderly. In so doing, I am 
including observations on the elderly whose living arrangements are unaffected by the 
reimbursement change, but for whom substitution toward informal care happens in 
other ways. For instance, if only one spouse needs home health care and after the BBA 
home health care agencies refuse to provide their services to the frail elderly, the other 
spouse might provide the needed informal care. In this case it might not be necessary 
for this couple to live with another person. Because I can only measure changes in 
living arrangements as a proxy for changes in informal care, if the estimate of the 
impact of the policy change on living arrangements is statistically significant, it is 
likely underestimating the extent of substitution from formal to informal care.   
The variable nist represents the number of Medicare home health care visits 
received by the elderly Medicare beneficiary i in state s in year t, States and Yeart are 
state and year dummies, respectively, and εist is the individual specific random error 
term. In this paper, I am interested in testing whether c2 is negative. If the structural 
Equation (2) is properly specified and estimated, a negative estimate on c2 implies that 





  If the home health visits were randomly assigned in the population, then 
Equation 2 could be estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, it is 
plausible to think that omitted variables bias the OLS estimate of c2. The direction of 
the bias is, in principle, unknown. A possible way to try to address this issue, and 
recover an unbiased estimate of c2, is to use the impact of the policy change introduced 
by the IPS as an instrument for nit. The exogenous variation created by the 
reimbursement change of Medicare home health Care in 1997 suggests that the law 
change variable, Restrictivenesssc , interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 in the 
post policy31 period (Postt) can be used as an instrument for the number of visits that an 
elderly receives. 
  There are two reasons that support the use of Postt*Restrictivenesssc as an 
instrument for nist. First, it is plausible to assume that, once conditioning on other 
exogenous right hand side variables like state and year dummies, 
Postt*Restrictivenesssc is orthogonal to the error term in Equation 2. This assumption 
seems appropriate in the context of the policy change studied in this paper. In 
particular, it seems unlikely that the reimbursement change affected living 
arrangements directly through a decline in the intensity of care per visit. In fact, 
discussed in the previous section, each home health agency was subject to a per-visit 
reimbursement limit even before the policy change studied here. Therefore, even before 
the introduction of the IPS every home health care agency had the incentive to 
minimize the intensity of care provided during each visit. 
  Moreover, Postt*Restrictivenesssc seems a good candidate instrument for the 
number of Medicare home health care visits because the two variables are highly 
                                                




correlated. More precisely, McKnight (2004, 2006) finds that Postt*Restrictivenesssc 
had a statistically significant negative impact on the number of visits received by 
Medicare beneficiaries. More formally, McKnight (2004, 2006) estimates the following 
baseline equation: 
n ist  = h1+ h2 Postt*Restrictivenesssc+ h3 States +h4Year t+ η ist                                 (3)                
where nist is the number of Medicare home health care visits received by individual i in 
state s during year t, States  and Yeart are state and year dummies, respectively, and ηist 
is the individual specific random error term. The identifying assumption of McKnights 
(2004,2006) model is that, absent the reimbursement change, and conditional on level 
differences in the number of visits, states with a higher restrictive measure and states 
with a less restrictive measure would have had the same trends in the number of visits 
provided to Medicare beneficiaries in the post-policy period. 
   McKnight (2006) states that, the parameter h2 measures the impact of 
living- during the post policy period- in a state that provided an additional one visit per 
user above the regional (census division)32 during the pre-policy period. 
  However, it is possible to interpret the parameter h2 as the impact of not 
reimbursing 0.25 additional visits per user in the post policy period. An example might 
prove useful in illustrating the reasoning beyond this interpretation. I consider two 
states, in the same census division C. I assume that the average number of visits per 
user in census division C and in state 2 in 1994 is equal to N-1. I also assume that the 
average number of visits per user in state 1 in 1994 is equal to N. Because from 1997 
onwards states face a cap that is based on 25% of the average number of visits in each 
                                                




states census division, starting in October 1997 state 1 is reimbursed at most N- 0.25 
visits.33 In other words, state 1, relatively to its 1994 level, is not reimbursed for 0.25 
visits. On the other hand, state 2, from 1997 onwards, is reimbursed at most N-1 visits, 
all the visits provided in 1994. Both states faced similar increasing trends in Medicare 
use compared to their respective 1994 levels. More formally, the identifying 
assumption of lack of differential trends implies that state 1 in the post policy period 
faces a limit, compared to its average utilization, that is more restrictive (by a factor of 
0.25 visits) than the one faced by state 2. In other words, the parameter of interest gives 
the impact of precluding reimbursement of 0.25 additional visits per user, so, to recover 
the impact of not reimbursing one additional visit per user, h2 must be multiplied by 4. 
  Unfortunately, there is not a single large dataset that contains information on 
both the number of visits received by Medicare Beneficiaries and living arrangement 
status. Because of this limitation, as explained more in detail in section 2.4, I need to 
use estimates coming from two different datasets. More precisely, in this paper I use 
March CPS data34 to estimate the following reduced form equation:  
y ist  = a1+ a2 Postt*Restrictivenesssc+ a3 States +a 4Year t+ υ ist                                         (4)                           
  Then, I recover a structural estimate of c2 by combining my estimate of a2 with 
McKnights estimate of h2 obtained by estimating Equation 3 with the Medicare 
Current Beneficiary Survey35 . Implicit in estimating the reduced form Equation 4 is the 
assumption I make in the structural Equations 2 and 3, that tighter reimbursement limits 
                                                
33 [0.75N+0.25(N-1)]. 
34 Section 2.4 describes this dataset in more detail. 





for Medicare home care visits affect living arrangements through the decline in the 
provision of home care visits. 
  For estimating Equation 4, I compare the change in living arrangements in 
states that faced a more restrictive reimbursement limit with changes in living 
arrangements in states that face less restrictive reimbursement limits using a difference 
in differences methodology. To do this, I rely on the assumption that, absent the policy 
change, states with more restrictive limits and states with less restrictive ones would 
have had the same trends in living arrangements. 
  To investigate the plausibility of the assumption, I restrict the sample to years 
1988 to 1997 and run a regression where, controlling for state and year effects, I test for 
the existence of differential trends in shared living arrangements across states with 
different restrictiveness measures. Column 1 of Table 2.3 shows that the coefficient of 
interest on the linear trend interacted with the restrictiveness measure is very small and 
statistically insignificant. I estimate the model in Equation 4 using a linear probability 
model and clustering standard errors by state (Moulton 1990; Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan, 2004). 
  The parameter a2 in the reduced form Equation 4 identifies the impact of not 
reimbursing 0.25 additional visits per user on the fraction of elderly that live in shared 
living arrangements. By using the same reasoning applied to the interpretation of the 
parameter h2, it is possible to recover the impact of not reimbursing one additional visit 
per user on the fraction of elderly that live in shared living arrangements by multiplying 






  In order to estimate the reduced form Equation 4, I merge data from March 
CPS from 1988 to 2001 with 1994 state level data on Medicare Home Care visits from 
the Health Care Financing Review Medicaid and Medicare Statistical Supplement. The 
CPS is a large nationally representative survey of 50,000 to 60,000 households that is 
conducted monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Every March, a demographic 
supplement is added to the basic monthly questionnaire. Respondents are in the CPS for 
four months, out for eight months, and then return to the sample for another four 
months, so there is a panel component in the CPS.  Although the CPS does not contain 
detailed information for the full sample on health or health utilization (including the use 
of home health care), it is a very large sample that contains information on living 
arrangements.36 It is in fact the availability of a large number of observations that 
makes the CPS the most suitable dataset to estimate the reduced form Equation 4. I 
focus on people at least 65 years of age because the vast majority of Medicare home 
health care users are at least 65 years old. For example, in 1996, the year before the 
policy change, 92.2 percent of Medicare home health care users were 65 years old or 
older. I focus on this group also because the aging of population makes the 
understanding of factors driving changes in living arrangements of the elderly an 
increasingly important issue (UN, 2005). 
  I begin my sample in March 1988, the year before the expansion occurred in 
1989 and end it in March 2001. I use data until March 2001, despite the introduction of 
the Prospective Payment System in October 2000, because the living arrangements in 
                                                




March 2001 have been affected for the majority of the previous year by the Interim 
Payment System.  
  Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for the pooled sample and different 
marital status categories, and shows that married individuals are much less likely to live 
in a shared living arrangement. Moreover, Table 2 highlights that married individuals 
are more educated on average than everybody except the never married. They also tend 
to be disproportionately white. 
 
2.5 Reduced-Form Estimation Results  
2.5.1 Estimation Results 
  Table 2.4 to Table 2.9 present estimates of Equation 4. The point estimate of 
the parameter of interest of the baseline regression 4 is shown in the first row of Table 
2.4, and it is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, implying, under the 
identifying assumption of the model, that a decline in reimbursement of one visit per 
patient increases the fraction of elderly that live in shared living arrangement by 0.22 
percentage points. Because 22.35 percent of the elderly in my sample live in shared 
living arrangements, the parameter estimate implies a 0.98 percent increase in the 
fraction of elderly that live in shared living arrangements. 
  An example might prove useful to understanding the decline in the number of 
visits reimbursed that a policy change like the one studied here might imply. For this 
purpose, I use the cross-state distribution implied by the restrictiveness measure of 
Equation 1 to compare the decline in visits reimbursed in Georgia, a state that 




middle of the distribution. More specifically, Georgia in 1994 was providing 102 visits 
per user, 33 visits above the average number of visits per user in its census division. 
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, was providing 43 visits per user in 1994, the same 
average number of visits per user provided in its census division. Trends in the number 
of users per 1000 beneficiary and in the number of visits per user were very similar in 
the pre-policy period in Georgia and Pennsylvania, but Georgia from 1998 onwards is 
reimbursed for at most 93.75 visits per user,37 implying a decline of 8.25 visits per user 
compared to its 1994 utilization level. 
  Pennsylvania, on the contrary, from 1998 onwards is reimbursed for all the 43 
visits per user provided in 1994. Because utilization levels increased between 1994 and 
1997 in both states, the reimbursement would be low for both states, but the decline in 
reimbursement would be more pronounced (by a factor of 8.25 visits per capita under 
the identifying assumptions) for Georgia. Within this framework, the point estimate of 
the parameter of interest in Table 2.4 suggests that a decline in reimbursement of 8.25 
visits increases the fraction of elderly that live in a shared living arrangement by 1.82 
percentage points,38 an increase of 8.11 percent in the baseline fraction of elderly that 
live in a shared living arrangement. Is this a large effect? The effect is quite large.  To 
give a sense of the magnitude of the effect, I use March CPS data for year 1970 and 
2000. In 1970, 31.77 percent of the elderly lived in shared living arrangements but only 
23.27 percent did so by year 2000, a decline of 26.75 percent. These numbers suggest 
                                                
37 75 percent of the visits that it was providing in 1994 and percent of the visits that were provided on 
average in Georgias Census division, 0.75*102+0.25*69=93.75. 
38 0.0005516*4*100=0.22 gives the impact of not reimbursing one additional visit.0.22*8.25=1.82 gives 




that an increase of 8.11 percent in the fraction of elderly that live in shared living 
arrangements in the most impacted state relative to the median state in the short  
post-policy period considered in this chapter is a relatively large number. 
  In column 2 of Table 2.4 I add marital status dummies,39 as married 
individuals are less likely to live in shared living arrangements, perhaps because the 
spouse acts as the first provider of informal care (Norton, 2001). The coefficient of the 
parameter of interest is smaller in this specification and implies that a decline in 
reimbursement of one visit per user increases the fraction of elderly Medicare 
beneficiaries that live in shared living arrangements by 0.19 percentage points. Also, a 
decline in reimbursement of 8.25 visits increase the fraction of elderly that live in 
shared living arrangements by 1.57 percentage points. These numbers imply, 
respectively, an increase of 0.85 percent and 7 percent in the fraction of elderly that live 
in shared living arrangements. The inclusion of age dummies controls for different 
propensities to live alone by age as in Gruber, Enghelhardt and Perry (2005). The sex 
dummy controls for the sexual division of labor that suggests that men acquire lower 
human capital than women in the production of household goods (Becker, 1991) in 
younger ages and therefore, everything else equal, are more likely than women to 
depend on somebody elses work inside the house.  
                                                
39 It is possible to think that the policy change might impact marital status, as the decline in the provision 
of formal care creates an increased demand of informal care from the spouse. I tested for this possibility 
by running regressions with marital status categories as outcomes and I tried different specifications 
using as independent variables the Postt*Restrictivenesssc and state and year dummies. Other 
specifications included age, education dummies and a race dummy. In no case I could reject the 




  The race dummy is included to capture different cultural norms related to the 
choice of living arrangement.40 In particular, Whites are less likely than Asians and 
Blacks to live in intergenerational households (Kamo, 2000). This variable is also 
capturing, at least in part, the effect of the higher income and wealth of whites when 
compared to all other races together. Column 3 of Table 2.4 adds age, sex and race 
dummies to the specification of column 2.  
  Because the literature on living arrangements of the elderly suggests that 
privacy is a normal good (Gruber, Engelhardt and Perry, 2005; Costa 1995, 1999), both 
the income effect and the cultural effect that the white dummy is picking up suggest 
that whites are less likely to live in shared living arrangements. Consistent with 
expectations, the coefficient on the white dummy in column 4 of Table 2.4 is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, implying that whites are 18.2 
percentage points less likely than others to live in shared living arrangements. The 
specification in column 4 of Table 2.4 controls for different intercepts by education. 
These variables are likely to pick up a direct positive effect of education on health 
(Cutler, Lleras-Muney, 2006) that increases an individuals ability to live independently 
and an indirect effect, due to the correlation between education and income, and 
education and wealth. The coefficients on the education dummies have the expected 
signs, although only the coefficient on people with a low education level (at most high 
                                                
40 I included only one race dummy to minimize measurement error. Measurement error in race coding in 
the period under study is a possibility because the CPS changed in 1997 the way used to record race. 
Before 1997 respondents could declare to be in one of the following categories: White, Black, American 
Indian or Aleut Eskimo, Asian or Pacific Islander, Other. Starting in 1996 the category Other has been 
suppressed. This might have impacted, for example, the race coding for people of mixed race in an 
unknown manner. It is a possibility that this has changed the correlation between race and living 
arrangement for the least numerous races, Asians, American Indian and Aleut Eskimo. However, it is 
unlikely that the change has affected the correlation of race and living arrangements of whites relative to 




school) is statistically significant (and positive relative to those with at least a college 
education). The estimate of the parameter of interest is always statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level across all specifications, and its magnitude is not substantially 
altered. The most conservative estimate in column 4 of Table 2.4 suggests that a decline 
in reimbursement of one visit per user increases the fraction of elderly Medicare 
beneficiaries that live in shared living arrangement by 0.18 percentage points. Also, a 
decline in reimbursement of 8.25 visits per user increases the fraction of elderly that 
live in shared living arrangements by 1.48 percentage points. These numbers imply an 
increase of 0.8 percent and 6.64 percent in the fraction of elderly that live in a shared 
living arrangement, respectively. 
  In Table 2.5, I estimate the model specifications of Table 2.4 over people 
between 65 and 80 years old, because previous research (McKnight, 2004, 2006) 
suggested that heavy users of Medicare Home Care services are, on average, 76 years 
old.41 The magnitude of the parameter of interest increases, implying that a decline in 
reimbursement of one visit per user increases the fraction of elderly Medicare 
beneficiaries between 65 and 80 that live in shared living arrangements between 0.23 
and 0.26 percentage points, depending on the specification. In my sample, 21.84 
percent of the elderly between 65 and 80 years old live in shared living arrangements, 
and therefore, the estimates of the parameter of interest in Table 2.5 imply an increase 
between 1.05 percent and 1.19 percent in the fraction of elderly that live in shared 
living arrangements. 
                                                
41 More precisely, McKnight (2004, 2006) tries to identify the potential heavy users of home health 
care services. To do so she uses pre policy data to regress home care expenditures on a variety of 




  In Table 2.6, I show estimates of the model on Medicare beneficiaries at least 
80 years old. The parameter of interest is not statistically significant for any 
specification used. The point estimates are also quite different depending on the 
specification chosen. This result might be simply driven by the smaller sample size of 
the oldest elderly. 
  In Table 2.7, I estimate the model on unmarried people between 65 and 80 
years of age because unmarried people in this age range are more likely than married 
people to be heavy users of Medicare Home care services (McKnight, 2004, 2006). The 
parameter of interest is statistically significant at the 5 percent level across all different 
specifications for this group of beneficiaries, implying that a decline in reimbursement 
of one visit per user increases the fraction of elderly in this group that live in shared 
living arrangements by 0.45 percentage points. Because the percentage of unmarried 
elderly between 65 and 80 years old that live in shared living arrangements in my 
sample is equal to 30.37 percent, this estimate implies an increase of 1.48 percent in the 
fraction of elderly that live in shared living arrangements. I also estimated the model 
separately for men and women. The parameter of interest shown in the first row of 
Table 2.8 is statistically significant only for the sample of women.42 This result might 
be driven by the larger sample size of elderly women.43 
   The baseline model estimate of the parameter of interest for the sample of 
women shown in Table 2.8 implies that a decline in reimbursement of one visit per user 
increases the fraction of elderly women that live in a shared living arrangement by 0.25 
                                                                                                                                      
sample of all beneficiaries between 1992 and 1999. Those that are at the top quartile of predicted home 
care expenditures are defined heavy users of home health care services.  
42 Table 2.9 reports estimation results for the sample of elderly men. 




percentage points. Because 23.53 percent of elderly women in my sample live in a 
shared living arrangement, the parameter estimate implies a 1.06 percent increase in the 
fraction of elderly women that live in shared living arrangements. 
 
2.5.2 Alternative Explanations: Changes in the Sample of Institutionalized Elderly 
  In this section I argue that my results are not driven by changes in the sample 
of non institutionalized elderly44 caused by changes in utilization of skilled nursing 
facility services by long term and short term care patients. In particular, I focus on two 
possibilities: I first look at whether the use of long term skilled nursing services by 
Medicare patients has changed because of changes in reimbursement of Medicare home 
health care and then I look at whether it is plausible to assume that the Medicare 
reimbursement of skilled nursing services that occurred in 1997 has increased the 
fraction of long term care patients in the community. 
  Considering the first aspect, the BBA changed the price of home health care 
relative to institutional care for chronic patients that were the ones more likely to be 
denied Medicare Home health care after 1997 (McKnight, 2004,2006). Since long term 
institutional care became relatively more attractive after 1997 for long-term care 
patients, it is important to try to understand whether there was an increase in the use of 
institutional care in a manner correlated with the parameter in my estimates that 
                                                
44 Conversations with staff at the Census Bureau together with information found in the Census 
documentation at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf1.pdf  clarified that institutionalized 
elderly that are not in the CPS sample are those that reside in a facility that provides 24 hours medical 
or nursing care. Those not residing in that type of facility are in the CPS sample recorded as living in 
group quarters. I have only 399 observations in the all sample that live in group quarters and therefore 




captures the impact of the imposition of limits in reimbursement on Medicare Home 
Health care on living arrangements of the elderly.  
  This correlation would create trouble for my interpretation of the results 
presented in the previous section if those remaining in the community after the 
Medicare home care policy change are those that are more likely to live in a shared 
living arrangement independently of home care use. In fact, in this case my results 
would indicate a substitution between home care and institutional care instead of 
capturing the substitution between home care and informal care. However, previous 
literature suggests that skilled nursing facilities services and home health care are not 
substitutes (Cutler and Sheiner, 1993).      
  Moreover, even more pertinent for the policy change studied here, previous 
literature (McKnight, 2004, 2006) has shown that the change in reimbursement of 
Medicare home health care introduced by the BBA had no effect on the use of  
long-term nursing home care. This result held even when looking separately at the use 
of nursing home services by the unhealthiest Medicare beneficiaries.45 
  Considering the second aspect, the BBA of 1997, besides changing Medicare 
Home Care reimbursement, contains provisions that changed Medicare reimbursement 
for post-acute care facilities from a cost-based system to Prospective Payment. In 
contrast to the system in place before, the Prospective Payment System (PPS) limited 
payment to skilled nursing facilities to predetermined levels (Wodchis, Fries and Hirth, 
2004). This change in reimbursement has led to shorter length of stay in rehabilitation 
                                                
45 Besides looking at utilization, it seems interesting to investigate whether Medicaid take-up changed 
after the BBA. I investigated this possibility using the self reported measure of Medicaid coverage 
during the previous 12 months. There is no correlation between self reported Medicaid coverage and 




and physical therapy (Woodchis 2004; Yip, Wilber and Myrtle, 2002) and has 
increased the relative risk of discharge to home for Medicare patients compared to non 
Medicare patients (Wodchis, Fries and  Hirth, 2004). 
  McKnight (2006)46 has found that the variable Postt*Restrictivenesssc was 
negatively correlated with the use of short term skilled nursing facility care. More 
specifically, McKnight (2006) found a negative correlation between 
Postt*Restrictivenesssc and skilled nursing facility care only when looking at all 
Medicare beneficiaries. The negative correlation disappeared when the observations 
that had an inpatient hospital stay were excluded from the sample. Since Medicare 
covers skilled nursing facility care only after inpatient hospital care,47 McKnight (2006) 
interpreted the negative correlation between Postt*Restrictivenesssc and skilled nursing 
facility use as evidence of a correlation between the IPS and PPS for skilled nursing 
care. 
  In principle, if the Medicare reimbursement change for skilled nursing 
facilities has released from institutional care the patients that are more likely to live in 
shared living arrangements, my results could be driven by compositional shifts in the 
sample of non-institutionalized elderly other than by a causal effect of Medicare Home 
Care reimbursement change. 
  This scenario is implausible, however, because the CPS does not record  
people living in a household only temporarily as members of a household. For example, 
if a post-acute patient who was released prematurely from skilled nursing care covered 
by Medicare decided to live temporarily with someone who could  take care of  him/her  
                                                
46 McKnight (2006) explains that the dataset that she is using distinguishes the use of skilled nursing 




until complete recovery, this patient would not be recorded as living in that household. 
This means that it is plausible to assume that the sample of non-institutionalized elderly 
that I am using is independent of the Medicare reimbursement change for skilled 
nursing facilities that occurred in 1997. 
  
2.5.3 Alternative Explanations: Dynamics in the Medicaid Home and Community 
Based Care Services Market  
  A natural question to ask is whether my results are due to other market 
dynamics in the home care market and in particular in the Medicaid48 home care 
market.   
  By federal mandate, states are required to provide Medicaid home health 
services to persons entitled to receive skilled nursing services under the states 
Medicaid plan. These services include skilled nursing, home health aid, medical 
equipment and appliances to be used in the home. Moreover, states have the option of 
providing additional services like physical therapy, occupational therapy speech 
pathology and audiology services (United States House of Representatives, 2004). 
  Medicaid regulations allow states to provide home and community based 
services under two programs: personal care services and home and community based 
waiver programs. Since 1975, states have the option of providing personal care services 
that include help with bathing, dressing, eating, toileting, personal hygiene, light 
                                                                                                                                      
47 And for a limited period of time. 
48 Medicaid is a joint federal-state program intended to provide medical services for the poor. 
Differently from Medicare, Medicaid varies greatly across states. Some elderly Medicare beneficiaries 
might also qualify for Medicaid if they meet eligibility requirements for Medicaid in the state where 
they live. 
As a general rule, Medicaid is considered the payer of last resort, so that if a service is covered under 




housework, laundry, meal preparation and grocery shopping. By 1998-1999, 26 states 
offered personal care services (Le Blanc, Tonner and Harrington, 2001). 
  Home and community based waiver programs, (authorized under Section 
1915 c of the Social Security Act) authorized by Congress in 1981, allow states to 
request waivers for certain Medicaid requirements (such as geographical coverage, for 
example) 49 to provide care at home for people entitled to skilled nursing services . 
  These programs attract federal matching funds and can cover a wide variety of 
services such as personal care assistance, homemaker/home health aid services, adult 
day care, case management, and respite for caregivers, among others (United States 
House of Representatives, 2004). Every state except Arizona50 had waivers in place in 
the years 1988-1999. 
  Aggregate data for the elderly in Figure 2.4 show that total expenditures for 
the mandatory Medicaid home health program and the two optional programs increased 
during the 90s  (Hagen, 2004). Unfortunately, it is very difficult to obtain state 
expenditures on Medicaid home and community based services only for the population 
of elderly Medicaid beneficiaries. However, if my results are driven by changes in 
Medicaid policies, in aggregate, I should see a different pattern of change in the use of 
home care services between Medicare only patients and Medicaid-Medicare dually 
enrolled individuals. 
  This suggests comparing the change in the fraction of elderly on Medicare 
only receiving home care with the change in the fraction of Medicare-Medicaid dually 
                                                
49 Also, states may cover state-selected groups of persons, rather than all persons otherwise eligible, 
House of Representatives, 2004. 
50 Arizona operates on a 1115 managed care waiver. For an in depth description of The Medicaid 




enrolled that receives home care services. I can recover this information by using 
National Health Interview Survey51 aggregate data that indicate that fraction of elderly 
MedicaidMedicare enrolled that received home care visits between 1998 and 2001 
decreased by 17.97 percent compared to a 15.91 percent decline in the fraction of 
Medicare only beneficiaries that received home care. The two numbers are remarkably 
similar, suggesting that it is unlikely that Medicaid policies might have been 
responsible for my results. To further the claim that Medicaid home and community 
based services changes are not responsible for my results, it is worth mentioning that 
McKnight (2006),52 in a regression that had Medicaid home and community based 
expenditure as an outcome variable, found that the coefficient of  Post*Restrictivenesssc 
was not statistically significant.53  
   
  2.6 A Structural Estimate 
  As CPS does not have information on the number of home care visits received 
by Medicare beneficiaries, I use the McKnights (2006) first stage estimate of the 
parameters h2 of Equation 3 and my estimate of the parameter a2 of Equation 4 to 
recover a structural estimate of c2. In fact, using the algebra of the Two Stages Least 
Square estimator,54 the structural estimate of ĉ2 in Equation 2 is equal55 to:  
ĉ2 = (â2)/ ( ĥ2)                                                                                                        (9) 
                                                
51 Appendix 2 briefly describes the National Health Interview Survey data used for this specification 
check. 
52 With Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey data between 1992 and 1999. 
53 Other control variables included state and year dummies, state trends, age group, gender, marital 
status and several other demographic variables, plus health condition variables. For a more detailed 
description see McKnight, 2006. 




where â 2 is the estimate of the law change parameter in the reduced form Equation 4 
estimated with CPS data on years 1993- 2000, which is equal to 0.0003394 .56 The 
estimate of ĥ2 comes from McKnights (2006) estimate of Equation 3 between years 
1992 and 1999 with Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey data and is equal to -0.133. 
  Using these values and Equation 9, the structural estimate of c2 is equal to  
-0.0025, suggesting that one additional visit of home health care decreases the fraction 
of elderly that live in shared living arrangements by 0.25 percentage points. This is a 
decrease of 1.2 percent in the fraction of elderly that live in shared living arrangements. 
To calculate the standard error of this estimate I follow Dee and Evans (1997). Under 
the reasonable assumption of independence between the CPS sample and the MCBS 
one, the covariance between the first stage estimate by McKnight and my reduced form 
estimate is 0. Using this assumption and a Taylor series expansion, it can be shown that 
the following equation holds: 
(est tstructural ) 2 ≈ 1/ [(est t reduced form)-2+ (est t first stage) -2]                     (10) 
where est (tstructural ) 2 is the square of  the estimated t statistics for the structural 
parameter and (est t reduced form)-2 and (est t first stage) -2 are the square of the 
inverse of  the estimated t statistics for the reduced form parameter and the first stage 
parameter, respectively. The relation in 10 suggests that, when the first stage is 
precisely estimated, the estimated t statistics of the structural parameter can be 
approximated with the t statistics of the reduced form parameter, suggesting that when 
the reduced form parameter is statistically significant, the structural parameter should 
                                                                                                                                      
55 When the first stage is estimated with a dataset and fitted values are created in a second dataset to 
recover a structural estimate, this estimate corresponds to the Two Sample Instrumental Variable 




also be statistically significant. Unfortunately, in this application, because the MCBS 
data are not available before 1992, in order to estimate the structural parameter ĉ2 I had 
to restrict my sample to years 1993-2000, which caused me to lose 104,233 
observations. The estimated t statistics of â2 using this reduced sample is equal to 1.35, 
and the estimated t statistic of the structural parameter ĉ2 is equal to 1.2.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
  With the aging of populations governments are more and more concerned 
about the affordability of home health care policies. What will happen to the elderly 
should the support of publicly provided home health care decrease? 
  This chapter suggests that informal care can substitute for publicly provided 
home health care services. I use time and cross-state variation introduced by a sharp 
decline in reimbursement of Medicare home health services in the United States to 
estimate reduced form equations of the impact of tighter reimbursement changes on the 
fraction of elderly that live in shared living arrangements. This is the first study that 
uses a quasi-experiment to address the issue for virtually all the non-institutionalized 
population of elderly of a country and therefore it is less subject to selection than 
previous studies. I also argue that my results are not driven by changed pattern of 
institutionalization of the elderly or by changes in Medicaid expenditures for home and 
community based services. 
  Moreover, I use my reduced-form estimate, and McKnights (2004, 2006) 
estimate of the impact of the reimbursement change on the number of Medicare home 
                                                                                                                                      
56 There is a temporal mismatch between CPS and MCBS, as year t MCBS data refer to the period 




health care visits to provide a structural estimate of the impact of the number of 
Medicare home care visits on the fraction of elderly that live in a shared living 
arrangement. 
  The results presented here do not allow me to estimate the welfare costs on the 
elderly and their caregivers of the Medicare reimbursement change.  However, there are 
margins other than living arrangements that may have been changed by the law change 
and which might potentially be measurable.  For example, the increased demand for 
informal care might have sizable implications for the labor supply of the informal 
caregivers (Ettner, 1995, a; Ettner, 1995 b).  Using March CPS from 1988-2001 I have 
estimated reduced form equations of labor supply (as measured by hours of work as 
well as participation in the labor force for women and men over 40) as the dependent 
variable and Post*Restrictivenesssc as main explanatory variable, controlling for state, 
year and demographic variables. I carried out this analysis also by refined age groups in 
10 and 5 year intervals for men and women over 40. The estimate of the parameter of 
interest was never statistically significant. This might indicate a lack of any effect on 
labor supply following the imposition of limits in reimbursement to home health care, 
or instead it might be an indication of the inadequacy of the March CPS data to study 
this outcome. Ideally, I would like to run the reduced form equations of labor supply for 
people more likely to be impacted by the policy change, i.e. those with parents that are 
still alive and that are frail, but that is not known in the CPS.   In general, future 
research on the effects of changes in formal care of the elderly on margins other than 
living arrangements may help in the assessment of the overall impacts of these changes 


































































































































Figure 2.2: Medicare Home Health Care Visits per User 
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Figure 2.3: Medicare Home Health Care Users per 1000 Beneficiaries 
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Figure 2.4: Medicaid Expenditure on Home and Community Based Services for Elderly 
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Table 2.1  
Living Arrangements of the Elderly and Public Expenditure on Home Health Care,  
(as a Percentage of the  GDP), Year 2000 
  Fraction of elderly 65+ living in 
shared living arrangements* 
Public Expenditure on Home 
Health Care as a % of the GDP 
Sweden 8.36  0.78 
Germany 10.64 0.5 
Switzerland 13.27 0.2 
UK 15.09  0.32 
Canada 20.64  0.17 
US** 23.06  0.07 
Spain 42.61  0.05 
* Shared living arrangement means household size>2 if the respondent is married and living 
with the spouse, household size>1 otherwise. All data for the living arrangements of the 
elderly in European countries and Canada are from the Luxemburg Income Study, data for 
the United States are from March Current Population Survey,2000. Data on public 
expenditures for home health care are from OECD, 2005 for all countries except the US. 
**For the US, expenditures on Medicare Home Health Care in 2000 are from the Health Care 
Financing Review, Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement. Data on the US GDP are 














       Table 2.2 
Summary Statistics for Selected Variables. 65+ or Older  
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Observations 233864 127701 2321 2260 12751 78849 9982 
* Shared living arrangement means household size>2 if the respondent is married and living 




































































- - Yes Yes 
less than high school - - - .088** 
(.0075) 
high school - - - .033** 
(.004) 
some college - - - -.006 
(.006) 
Observations 173445 173445 173445 173445 
    **: significant at the 1 percent level. Restrictivenesssc=As-Ac where As is the average number 
of Medicare home care visits per user in state s in 1994 and Ac is the average number of 
Medicare home care visits per user in states census division c. State and year dummies are 
included in every specification. Standard errors are clustered by state and are shown in 
parenthesis.  
 


























































- - Yes Yes 
less than high school - - - .092** 
(.0083) 
high school - - - .037** 
(.0036) 
some college - - - -.00075 
(.0056) 
Observations 233864 233864 233864 233864 
    *,**: significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Restrictivenesssc=As-Ac where As 
is the average number of Medicare home care visits per user in state s in 1994 and Ac is the 
average number of Medicare home care visits per user in states census division c. State and 
year dummies are included in every specification. Standard errors are clustered by state and are 






























































- - Yes Yes 
less than high school - - - .095** 
(.0097) 
high school - - - .036** 
(.0036) 
some college - - - .00019 
(.0058) 
Observations 190643 190643 190643 190643 
   *, **: significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Restrictivenesssc=As-Ac where As 
is the average number of Medicare home care visits per user in state s in 1994 and Ac is the 
average number of Medicare home care visits per user in states census division c. State and 
year dummies are included in every specification. Standard errors are clustered by state and are 






























































- - Yes Yes 
less than high school - - - .082** 
(.009) 
high school - - - .042** 
(.01) 
some college - - - -.005 
(.01) 
Observations 50908 50908 50908 50908 
*,**: significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Restrictivenesssc=As-Ac where As is 
the average number of Medicare home care visits per user in state s in 1994 and Ac is the 
average number of Medicare home care visits per user in states census division c. State and 
year dummies are included in every specification. Standard errors are clustered by state and are 














Estimation Results, 65-80 All but Married, Spouse Present  












































- - Yes Yes 
less than high school - - - .119** 
(.01) 
high school - - - .061** 
(.007) 
some college - - - -.0011 
(.013) 
Observations 76484 76484 76484 76484 
*,**: significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Restrictivenesssc=As-Ac where As is 
the average number of Medicare home care visits per user in state s in 1994 and Ac is the 
average number of Medicare home care visits per user in states census division c. State and 
year dummies are included in every specification. Standard errors are clustered by state and are 






























































- - Yes Yes 
less than high school - - - .107** 
(.009) 
high school - - - .047** 
(.004) 
some college - - - .002 
(.007) 
Observations 137843 137843 137843 137843 
*,**: significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Restrictivenesssc=As-Ac where As is 
the average number of Medicare home care visits per user in state s in 1994 and Ac is the 
average number of Medicare home care visits per user in states census division c. State and 
year dummies are included in every specification. Standard errors are clustered by state and are 














Estimation Results, Men 65+  
Postt*Restrictivenesssc .0004417 
(.00037) 












































- - Yes Yes 
less than high school - - - .078** 
(.009) 
high school - - - .031** 
(.005) 
some college - - - .002 
(.006) 
Observations 96021 96021 96021 96021 
*,**: significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Restrictivenesssc=As-Ac where As is 
the average number of Medicare home care visits per user in state s in 1994 and Ac is the 
average number of Medicare home care visits per user in states census division c. State and 
year dummies are included in every specification. Standard errors are clustered by state and are 












Chapter 3: Ownership and Exit Behavior When Entry Costs Are 
Low: The Case of Home Health Agencies in California 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 This chapter represents a preliminary investigation of a new dataset on home 
health utilization in California. California is a large state with a wealth of good health 
care data and perhaps both these reasons explain why California is such a popular 
choice for research in health economics.57 Table 3.1 shows some measures of home 
health care utilization in California and in the United States as a whole for the period 
1996-2000 from the Medicare and Medicaid Statistical supplement. The percentage 
change in the number of Medicare beneficiaries that used Medicare home health care 
between 1996 and 2000 and the percentage change in the number of visits per user 
between 1996 and 2000 are similar for California and the United States as a whole. In 
fact, columns 2 and 4 of Table 3.1 show that between 1996 and 2000 the number of 
users of Medicare home health care per 1000 beneficiary dropped by 32 percent in the 
United States as a whole. In California, during the same period, the number of users 
per 1000 beneficiaries dropped by 32.5. Table 3.1 also highlights that, between 1996 
and 2000, in the United States as a whole the number of visits per user dropped by 50 
percent and the number of visits per user during the same period dropped by 45 
percent in California. When looking at level differences in the number of users of 
Medicare home health care for 1,000 beneficiaries between 1996 and 2000, Table 3.1 




visits per user than the average visits per user received by beneficiaries in the United 
States as a whole. A possible explanation for this difference may be the better health 
of Medicare home health care users in California compared to the country as a whole. 
 In this chapter, I investigate the impact of the IPS on exit of for-profit and  
not-for-profit home health care agencies. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 suggest that the two 
types of providers exited at different rates during the period 1994-2000. Figure 3.1 
shows the survival function, i.e. the probability that an agency lasts at least until 
period t given that it lasted until period t-1. In Figure 3.1 ownership=1 means for 
profit and ownership=2 means not-for-profit. Figure 3.1 shows that, after an initial 
period in which the two types of agencies seem to have the same probability of 
surviving, for-profit agencies have a lower probability of surviving than the 
probability of surviving for not-for profit agencies. Figure 3.2 shows the fraction of 
agencies that leaves the market in a given year. Figure 3.2 shows that, at any point in 
time, for-profit agencies exit at higher rates than not-for-profit agencies. It is also 
apparent that the difference in the exit rates between the two types of agencies is 
increasing over time. 
  The reimbursement change introduced by the BBA in the home health care 
market represents an interesting case to study differences in exit behavior between 
for-profit and not-for-profit providers because of the coexistence of five facts. First, 
home health care agencies face extremely low entry barriers which might contribute 
to a selection of providers that are different along a series of observable and 
unobservable characteristics. This raises the question of whether the greater 
                                                                                                                                      
57 Papers that have used health care data in California are numerous. For example, See Duggan (2000), 




likelihood of provider heterogeneity in the home health care industry (relative to 
industries such as hospitals) translates into different responses by ownership type to 
the decreased profitability of Medicare home health care reimbursement.  
 Second, one might expect greater provider heterogeneity in the home health 
care market compared to other health care markets because government monitoring of 
home health agencies is more difficult than monitoring of other health care providers. 
In fact, all home health care agencies provide care in the home of their patients.58 
This means that surveyors need to have patients authorization to inspect the home 
health care personnel during the visits. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such 
collaboration is not easy to obtain (Gao, 1997). In addition, home health services are 
provided in several different locations, various patients homes, making it very costly 
to sample more than one visit and in fact, this sampling is very rarely done in practice 
(Gao, 1997). Thus, it is more likely that non-compliant providers exist in the home 
health care industry than in other markets and this, in turn, strengthens the hypothesis 
of greater provider heterogeneity in the home health care industry compared to other 
health care markets. 
 Third, home health care agencies receive most of their revenues from 
Medicare, making it less troublesome than in most other health care markets to 
identify the impact of government reimbursement on exit. Forth, the IPS allows me to 
combine in my analysis of exit time series variation and cross provider variation. 
Fifth, since Medicare reimbursement of home health agencies varies across localities, 
I can construct a precise measure of the market in which an agency operates and 
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control for this measure in my estimate of the impact of the BBA. This last point 
represents the most novel contribution of this chapter.  
 
3.2  Review of the Empirical Literature  
 My study adds to the literature that examines whether for-profit and  
not-for-profit providers respond differently to financial incentives. For example, 
authors that have studied hospitals have concentrated on differences by ownership 
type on the provision of uncompensated care (Lewin and Eckels, 1988; Norton and 
Staiger, 1994), market power (Gruber, 1994), cost and quality (Sloan et al., 2001), 
offer of unprofitable services (Gray, 1986; Mark et al., 1997) mortality (Hartz et al. 
1989; Shortell and Huges,1988; Ettner and Hermann, 2001), charges (Gray, 1991; 
Hall and McGuire, 1987; Sloan et al, 2001), upcoding (Silverman and Skinner, 2001; 
Dafny, 2005), length of stay (Kuttner, 1996) and the care of the indigent after changes 
in the profitability of treating them (Duggan, 2000).59 With the exception of Dafny 
(2005), these studies find little differences in the behavior of for-profit and  
not-for-profit hospitals. This trend does not appear when considering exit. For 
example, Chackravarty et al. (2005) find that for-profit hospitals are more responsive 
than not-for profit ones in their exit behavior following demand shifts proxied by 
changes in the fraction of the elderly population in the area where the hospital 
operates.  
 Several studies have focused on health care providers other than hospitals to 
investigate differences in behavior between for-profit and not for-profit entities. For 
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example, Ozgen and Ozcan (2002) find that not-for-profit dialysis centers tend to be 
more inefficient than for-profit dialysis centers, but for-profit centers tend to behave 
more inefficiently than not-for-profit centers when the concentration of for-profit 
providers in a given market (measured by a Metropolitan Statistical Area or by a 
county for providers in rural areas) increases. Another study by Sindelar and 
Olmstead (2004) looks at the impact of managed care penetration on substance abuse 
treatment services and finds that managed care causes for-profit providers to offer 
four (out of 26) additional services, causes public to offer four fewer services, and has 
no impact on the number of services offered by not-for-profit providers. Lindrooth 
and Weisbrod (2007) examine hospices response to changes in Medicare 
reimbursement and find that for-profit hospices are significantly less likely than  
not-for-profit hospices to admit patients with short, unprofitable length of stay. 
 Other studies on skilled nursing facilities have found behavioral differences 
between ownership types in nursing home utilization (Santerre and Vernon, 2005) 
and quality of care (Chou, 2001). A study by Dalton and Howard (2002) examined 
the impact of the introduction of a Prospective Payment System for Skilled Nursing 
Facilities in 1998 on exit patterns. The authors estimated an ordered probit of exit 
from a market for skilled nursing facilities controlling for state and county fixed 
effect. They did not find differences in exit behavior by ownership type. 
 The most relevant study for this chapter is the one by Horwitz (2005), that 
looks at whether for-profit hospitals are more likely than not-for-profit hospitals to 
exit from the home health care market after the introduction of the IPS in 1997. The 




operates. She finds large differences in hospitals responses to the change in the 
profitability of home health care. Horwitz is also interested in looking at whether 
there are spillover effects in behavior between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. 
To this end, she interacts ownership dummies with a measure of market defined as a 
metropolitan statistical area in which for-profit hospitals accommodate over 20 
percent of all admissions. Although this study suggests that for-profit and not-for-
profit providers might behave very differently when Medicare home health care is 
considered, the study by Horwitz (2005) did not control for the cross provider 
measure of restriction in reimbursement based on 1994 levels. The parameter that 
Horwitz estimates measures the percentage change in exit from the home health care 
market for for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.  
 In this chapter, I provide an upper and lower bound to the estimate a 
parameter that quantifies the impact of a decline in reimbursement of one visit per 
user on the percentage change in the probability that an agency exits at time t given 
that it lasted until time t, taking into account the cross provider variation implied by 
the way the reimbursement limit is constructed. By considering the cross provider 
measure of variation together with the time series variation, I provide a more 
complete picture of the impact of the law on exit. Moreover, since entry barriers in 
the Medicare home health care market are quite low, many other providers besides 
hospitals are involved in the provision of such services. This observation implies that 
the market for Medicare home health care services is broader than the one considered 
by Horwitz. In the current analysis, I investigate a wider variety of providers. By 




am using were owned by an in-patient facility, I find that 68 percent of the agencies 
were free-standing and only 32 percent were hospital based.  Finally, the measure of a 
market in which a hospital operates that Horwitz (2005) uses, contrary to the one that 
I propose, is not grounded in the institutions governing the Medicare Home Health 
Care market. 
   
3.3 Review of the Theoretical Literature 
 Depending on the model considered, the theoretical literature on behavioral 
differences between for-profit and not-for-profit institutions yields different 
predictions on exit behavior of not-for-profit and for-profit agencies. There are 
several models that assume altruism of the not-for-profit institutions.60 For example, 
Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998, 2006) argue that not-for-profit firms have a higher 
preference for output than for-profit firms. Because of this difference in objectives, 
not-for-profit firms facing declining profit opportunities should decrease the quantity 
of services provided, and therefore exit at lower rates than for-profit firms. Another 
model by Besley and Ghatak (2005) suggests that altruistic entrepreneurs and 
altruistic workers sort in mission oriented institutions, identified with not-for-profit 
firms. In this context, the major virtue of private not-for-profit firms is that 
entrepreneurs (principals) and workers (agents) have similar mission preferences, 
thereby minimizing the agency problem and the use of compensation as an incentive. 
In this scenario, a not-for-profit agency might be able to better deal with decreased 
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reimbursement generosity because entrepreneurs and workers might agree to continue 
pursuing their altruistic mission even with decreased monetary compensation. 
 Other models do not rely on altruism to predict differences in behavior 
between for-profit and not-for-profit firms. For example, Hansmann (1998) argues 
that not-for-profit organizations respond more slowly than for-profit organizations to 
changes in financial incentives, because not-for-profit firms face higher transaction 
costs. More specifically, because the not-for-profit firms have no owners, managers 
and workers at not-for-profit firms have more power than workers in for-profit ones 
and may successfully avoid closure of the firm even when the profitability of its 
services has decreased. The managers and workers at not-for-profit firms might, for 
example, resist closure because they are reluctant to lose their jobs and relocate to 
another firm.  
 Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) suggest that an entrepreneur that chooses to 
establish a not-for-profit firm gives up the appropriation of profits and, in so doing, 
gives the customer a credible signal that he will not cut on the quality of the services 
provided. This argument suggests that not-for-profit firms should be prevalent in 
those markets where the quality of the good is difficult to assess, as it is the case in 
the health care sector.  
 In the home health care market, the law states that doctors are responsible for 
referring patients to the home health care agencies. Thus, Glaeser and Shleifers 
(2001) intuition applied to the response of for-profit and not-for-profit agencies to the 
cuts introduced by the BBA suggests that doctors might have perceived that for-profit 




the quality of care provided to their patients after the cut in reimbursement introduced 
by the BBA. As a consequence, in order to avoid adverse health outcomes for their 
patients, doctors might have increased their referrals to not-for-profit agencies versus 
for-profit agencies. In this situation, for-profit agencies not only faced a cut in 
reimbursement, but also a decline in the volume of business induced by decline in 
referrals unlikely to have happened for not-for-profit firms and, as a consequence, 
for-profit agencies should exit the market at a faster rate than not-for-profit agencies. 
 Another model of hospital behavior by Pauly and Redish (1973) suggests that, 
since not-for-profit have no owners, they maximize the income of the most relevant 
stakeholders, identified as the physicians. In this context, the not-for-profit hospital, 
for a given number of medical staff, would produce the same quality and output 
produced by the not-for-profit hospital. Applied to the home health care market, the 
argument by Pauly and Redish (1973) suggests that the home health agency acts to 
maximize the income of the nurses, who, being the ones that admit the patients, play a  
role similar to the one that doctors play in the original model by Pauly and Redish 
(1973).  
 This proposition implies that one should not expect differences in behavior 
between for-profit and not-for-profit home health care providers when financial 
incentives change, as both providers care about profits and the only difference 
between the two types of agencies is that in the not-for-profit case the nurses receive 






3.4 Limit per-user 
 In this section, I illustrate how I constructed the cross-provider measure of 
reimbursement generosity implied by the IPS. The BBA states that, starting in 
October 1997, each agency is subject to an average per beneficiary limit that is a 
blend between the agencys 1994 per patient cost and the per patients cost in the 
agencys census division. I define a consolidated entity a firm composed by a 
parent and at least one branch.61 In this chapter, I use the following measure of  
cross-firm variation based on 1994 data: 
visitperpatient94= (Vi)/(Ni)                                                                                      (1) 
where, for a stand alone entity, Vi is the number of Medicare visits for which 
Medicare is the primary payer for agency i and Ni is the number of people at least 65 
years old that the agency has treated. When considering consolidated entities, Vi is 
the sum of visits for which Medicare is the primary payer across the parent and all 
branches and Ni is the sum of patients that are at least 65 years old across the parent 
and all branches. I use this approach with the consolidated entities to follow as 
closely as possible the Medicare home health care regulations that specify that parent 
and branches need to be considered as a single entity when computing the limit.62 The 
per-beneficiary limit in the sample defined in the next section is between 1.25 and 
298.12. 
 Since the above figure is blended for each agency with the same census 
division per patient limit, the higher is the variable visitperpatient94 the more 
restrictive is the final blended limit faced by each agency. For example, consider two 
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agencies with a number of visits per user in 1994 equal to 10 and 11, respectively. 
Also, assume that the Census division average number of visits per user is 5. The 
limit per user faced by agency 1 from 1997 onwards is 0.75*10+0.25*5=8.75 and the 
limit per user faced by the second agency is 0.75*11+0.25*5=9.5. In this example, 
after the policy change, agency 1 is not reimbursed 1.25 visits per user compared to 
its 1994 level and agency 2 is not reimbursed 1.5 visits per user compared to its 1994 
level. This finding implies that a one unit increase in the level of visitsperpatient94 
is a decrease in reimbursement per user of 0.25 visits compared to baseline 1994 
levels. In the datasets for years 1995 to 2000 there are also agencies that were not in 
the market in 1994. The law states that these agencies are assigned the median limit 
assigned to the agencies available in the market in 1994. Unfortunately, from 1995 
onwards, my data do not allow me to identify the number of patients 65 years of age 
or older.63 This drawback prevented me from constructing for these agencies a 
reliable measure of cross agency variation. Thus, in the analysis below, I focus my 
attention on those agencies that were Medicare certified in 1994. In 1996, the year 
before the policy change, such agencies had 70 percent of the market share as 
measured by the number of Medicare visits. 
 
3.5 Hazard Specifications 
 In this section, I present the econometric framework that I use to investigate 
the percentage change in the probability that an agency closes in year t given that it 
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has been in the market until year t due to a decline in reimbursement of one visit per 
user. 
 More formally (Wooldridge, 2002), let T>=0 denote the random variable that 
indicates the duration in which a home health agency is in the market; let t be a 
particular value of T. 
The cumulative density function of T can be defined as  
F(t)= P(T<=t)                            t>=0       (2) 
The survivor function, which denotes the probability that an agency lasts at least t 
periods, can be written as: 
S(t)= 1-F(t)                                                                                                 (3)  
The hazard function, that is the probability that an agency closes at time t, given that 
it has lasted until t, can be written as: 
        λ(t)=limh↓0Pr(t≤T<t+h|T≥t)/h                                                                             (4) 
 When covariates are included, the most common representation of the hazard 
function in the literature is the proportional hazard one. In formulas: 
       λ(t,x,β,λ0)=λ0(t)φ(x,β)                                                                                          (5)                              
where λ0(t) is called the baseline hazard. 
 The key difference in the various models estimated in the literature is on the 
assumption made regarding how the hazard varies over time, a feature called duration 
dependence. Depending on whether the hazard increases, decreases or is constant 
over time it is said to have positive, negative or no duration dependence, respectively. 
The Kaplan Meyer curves displayed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 seem to suggest that the 
                                                                                                                                      




hazard in this application might be monotonic. However, the Kaplan Meyer 
representation does not include covariates; thus, inferences to the case in which 
covariates are included might not be valid. 
 In this application, I first estimate (5) using a parametric model, more 
specifically a Weibull model that assumes that the hazard increases over time. More 
formally, the hazard function in this case has the following form: 
λ(t;X)=exp(X,β)αtα-1                                                                                                      (6) 
 The most common alternative to assuming that the hazard has a specific 
functional form is to avoid assuming any functional form altogether and to estimate 
the parameters β using the Cox model. Unfortunately, the Cox model is not an 
attractive alternative when there are many ties (Kiefer, 1988). Because I have many 
ties, i.e. many agencies leaving the market at the same time, I have decided not to use 
the Cox model. In addition to estimating Equation (6) I also estimate a  
piece-wise-constant Exponential model. In this specification, the time axis is divided 
in intervals (in my case I use seven intervals, one per year) and it is assumed that the 
hazard rate is constant within each interval, but may vary between intervals. This 
specification has the advantage that the overall shape of the baseline hazard does not 
have to be specified in advance. The hazard has the form: 
λ(τ;X)= λτ exp(X,β)                                                                                                  (7) 
where  τ =1,27 denotes the intervals . The constant interval specific hazard rates are 
equivalent to having interval specific intercepts in the overall hazard (Jenkins, 2005). 
                                                                                                                                      




In my analysis, the main variable of interest is a time varying covariate that takes the 
value of 0 for the first three periods and is equal to visitsperpatient94 for the 
remaining 4 periods. 
 To estimate (6) and (7) by maximum likelihood I need to assume ignorable 
censoring and strict exogeneity of the time varying covariates (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Ignorable censoring means that, once conditioning on the time in which each agency 
was first licensed and the market in which the agency locates, censoring is 
independent on the process determining the survival of the agencies in the market. In 
my application, I have right censoring since there are still agencies in the market after 
2000 and for them I only know that they last in the market at least until 2000. Strict 
exogeneity of the time varying covariates means that the path of the covariate is 
independent on whether the observation leaves the initial state. Here, the path of the 
time varying covariate that captures the impact of the BBA is determined by a law 
change, so that this assumption seems reasonable. 
 Furthermore, in the piece-wise-constant Exponential model, the other time 
varying covariates, the dummies that shift the hazard each year, are defined 
independently on whether an agency is still in the market, so that the assumption of 
strict exogeneity holds for these variables as well. 
 
3.6   Data  
 The data used for this study are the Annual Utilization Data for Home Health 
Agencies and Hospices for years 1994 to 2000 provided by the Office of Statewide 




contain information from two sources: a questionnaire filled out by each home health 
agency and administrative data added by the OSHPD.64 The administrative 
information that is particularly useful for this study is a permanent identifier attached 
to each home health care agency which allows it to be traced over time; the date in 
which the agency was licensed for the first time; and information on whether the 
agency is licensed in any given year. The questionnaire also addresses whether an 
agency is a branch or a parent. I wanted to check that the dataset from OSHPD was 
somewhat reliable and to this end Table 3.2 reveals that the number of Medicare 
visits per year reported in the OSHPD dataset is not substantially different from 
administrative data contained in the Medicaid and Medicare Statistical supplement 
issued by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid services.  
 Information regarding whether an agency is a parent or a branch is useful 
because the Balanced Budget Act requires that the limit per user needs to be 
calculated with parent and branches considered as one single entity. In this section I 
explain how I identified the consolidated entities in my dataset. 
 Ideally, one would be able to determine for each year which agencies in the 
market are consolidated entities. Unfortunately, this information is not available and 
data pertaining to different years present various problems. For example, I am able to 
identify for each year between 1995 and 2000 which agencies received a consolidated 
license for the first time. Therefore, if an agency that was first licensed and certified 
for Medicare in 1970 opens a branch in 1996, the 1996 dataset contains a variable 
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indicating that for the first time that year the two agencies received a consolidated 
license. However, if an agency that was first licensed in 1970 opened a branch in 
1971 and both agencies were still open in the period under study, the information on 
the agencies being consolidated would be missing.  
 Moreover, the 1994 dataset does not contain information regarding which are 
the agencies that received a consolidated license for the first time during 1994. The 
information indicating which agencies had a consolidated license for the first time in 
year t is available in the electronic dataset for years 1996 to 2000 and also in the 
printed copy of the report that I found at the Library of Congress for the year 1995. 
 In this chapter, I try to recreate the needed information, namely which entities 
are consolidated on the market in each year. To achieve this, I first observe that for 
each year the agencies that presented a consolidated license for the first time that year 
had the same name. For example, the parent Assisted Home Recovery in 1996 
opened a branch that was also called Assisted Home Recovery. Since for each year 
I know the name of each agency and whether an agency is a parent or a branch, I 
recreated the agencies that were consolidated entities by matching them by name. 
This method relies on assuming that all agencies that are consolidated entities share 
the same name. 
 In most cases home health agencies were stand-alone firms or entities 
composed of only one agency that declared itself to be a parent and only one or 
several agencies with the same name that declared themselves to be branches. In 
some other cases there were several parents and branches that had the same name (for 




branches to attribute to a parent. I deleted these observations from the dataset. They 
represent 11.25% of the agencies in the 1994 data. This implies that my results do not 
consider the impact of the policy change on agencies that are part of a chain. Among 
these agencies, seventy percent are for-profit. Their median year of entry in the 
market is 1989 and 51 percent are located in a rural market area. Chakravarty et al., 
(2005) have found that being part of a chain significantly decreases exit for for-profit 
compared to not-for-profit hospitals, but does not have any impact on behavior of not-
for-profit hospitals. This finding does not necessarily hold for home health agencies. 
In particular, it is reasonable to expect that in a market such as that of hospitals, in 
which investments are relatively substantial, chains that need to disinvest on a large 
scale might respond more slowly than hospitals that are stand-alone entities. In the 
home health care case, this is unlikely to occur as investments made to enter the 
market are negligible. Unfortunately, I cannot properly test whether agencies that 
belong to a chain behave differently from agencies that do not, as this would require 
me to be able to construct a cross agency measure of variation.  
  
3.7  Sample and Summary Statistics  
 An important feature of the data is the administrative information regarding 
whether an agency is licensed in any given year. More precisely, even if every agency 
should send their data to the OSHPD and the OSHPD solicits the data several times 
before constructing the final datasets, some agencies fail to comply. Since the 
OSHPD is the entity that releases the licenses, it knows whether an agency has been 




available in the dataset released by the OSHPD. 65 In my analysis, I consider an 
agency to be on the market in year t if it had been licensed in year t. I believe this to 
be a reasonable assumption, bearing in mind that an agency has to pay for the 
licensing process each year and it is doubtful that an agency would pay for a license 
and not use it at all. 
 Unfortunately, there is a non-response rate of 9.25 % among agencies that 
were in the market in 1994 and non-response is positively correlated with exit. In fact, 
57% of non-respondents exited the market in the period under study. This pattern 
might be due to the fact that an agency has to fill in the questionnaire relative to year t 
in March of year t+1, so the questionnaire might be delivered to the agency once it 
has already closed even if it was in operation during year t. In order to use  
non-respondents in my analysis, I have to impute Medicare certification and 
ownership type in the year in which an agency does not respond. These two variables 
turn out to be remarkably stable among respondents and in the present scenario I am 
relying on the assumption that this pattern applies to non-respondents in any year t as 
well. So, for example, if agency j declared in 1994 to be for-profit and Medicare 
certified and in 1996 agency j does not answer the questionnaire sent by the 
OSHPD, I assume that the agency is still for-profit and Medicare certified. 
 Table 3.3 displays the distribution of the variable visitperpatient94 in 1994 
on the sample of agencies in the market in 1994. In addition, the Table displays the 
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distribution of the variable visitperpatient94 by ownership type. Finally, in the last 2 
columns, the Table displays the distribution of the variable visitperpatient94 among 
non respondents in any given year and among agencies that closed in any given year. 
Table 3.4 shows the distribution of the variable visitperpatient94 for the entire 
sample and for the sample of for-profit and not for-profit agencies for year 2000.  
 Table 3.3 shows that agencies that closed and agencies that did not respond 
the questionnaire have a higher value of the variable visitperpatient94, suggesting 
that those agencies that were more restricted were the ones more likely to not respond 
the questionnaire by OSHPD. Since closure is positively correlated with non 
response, those agencies were also more likely to exit. Another way to look at the 
relationship between non-response and the level of visits per patients provided in 
1994 is to run the following regression: 
w it  = c1 + c2 Postt+ c2 Postt*Visitsperpatienti1994 +n t+ ε it                                                                (8)         
where w it  is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if agency i at time t does not respond 
to the questionnaire , Postt is equal to 1 for years  1997 to 2000 and it is equal to 0 for 
years 1994 to 1996. Estimation results of Equation (8) are shown in Table 3.5. It 
seems that the more restrictive the limit that an agency is supposed to face, the more 
likely it is that the agency will not respond, as the coefficient on c3 is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.  
 Table 3.6 shows the distribution of for-profit and not-for-profit firms in the 26 
markets defined by the different Medicare reimbursement indexes in 1994 and 2000. 
The Table shows that just over half of the agencies locate in the market defined as 




and not-for-profit agencies seem to locate in different areas. As a final note, for-profit 
and not-for-profit agencies differ in the year in which they were first licensed. The 
median year of first license for for-profit firms is 1990 and the median year of entry 
for not-for-profit firms is 1983.  
 
3.8 Estimation Results 
 Tables 3.7 present estimation results of Equations (6) and (7). The law change 
variable is a time varying variable that is equal to 0 for years 1994-1996 and is equal 
to the variable visitperpatient94 for years 1997-2000.The specifications in columns 
2 and 4 of Table 3.7 add dummies indicating the year in which an agency was first 
licensed as additional controls. These variables capture the idea that firms have a life 
cycle and that different firms are at different stages of that life-cycle at every point in 
time in the market. As a consequence, these firms might react in a variety of ways to 
the same economic shock (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Campbell and Abbring, 2005). 
When considering the Weibull specification, the exponentiated coefficient on the law 
change variable displayed in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.7 is positive, suggesting that 
the more restrictive  the reimbursement  limit is the higher is the probability that an 
agency exits at time t given that it lasted until t. However, the parameter is never 
statistically significant. On the contrary, the estimate of the exponentiated coefficient 
of the law change parameter with the piece-wise-constant Exponential model 
displayed in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.7 is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. I provide a higher and lower bound to interpret the parameter using the 




implied by the variable visitsperpatient94 in 1994 suggests that moving from the 
value of the variable visitsperpatient94 for the median provider  to the value of the 
variable visitsperpatient94 for the provider in  the 75th  percentile (See Table 3.3, 
column 2), which implies a decline in reimbursement of 5.1 visits per user, increases 
the hazard by 12.4 percent.66 The distribution of the variable visitsperpatient94 for 
year 2000 for the entire sample displayed in column 2 of Table 3.4 suggests a lower 
increase in the hazard because the most restricted providers, the ones with the highest 
values of visitsperpatient94, have exited the market by year 2000. Moving from the 
value of the variable visitsperpatient94 for the median provider to the value of the 
variable visitsperpatient94 for the provider in the 75th percentile in the 2000 
distribution (Table 3.3 column 3) suggests that a decline in reimbursement of 3.68 
visits per user increases the hazard by 8.9 percent. 
 Considering only for-profit agencies, the exponentiated coefficient of the law 
change parameter displayed in the first raw of Table 3.8 is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level only when the proportional hazard assumes a piece-wise-constant 
Exponential model. The point estimate of the parameter of interest in columns 4 and 5 
of Table 3.7 suggests that moving from the value of the variable visitsperpatient94 
for the median provider to the value of the variable visitsperpatient94 for the 
provider in the 75th percentile in 1994 (See Table 3.3 column 3) for this sample, 
which implies a decline in reimbursement of 5.5 visits per user, increases the hazard 
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by 12.2 percent.67 A closer look at the exponentiated coefficients on the interval 
specific intercepts reveals that, relative to the excluded category (period 1), the hazard 
declines in the second period and increases in all the other periods. Because I only 
have seven periods, the existence of one period in which the hazard is not increasing 
may be an important reason why the estimates obtained assuming the  
piece-wise-constant Exponential model are so different from the estimates obtained 
assuming the Weibull model. The distribution of the variable visitsperpatient94 for 
year 2000 suggests that moving from the value of the variable visitsperpatient94 for 
the median provider to the value of the variable visitsperpatient94 for the provider in 
the 75th percentile (Table 3.4, column 3), i.e. a decline in reimbursement of 5.4 visits 
per user, increases the hazard by 11.9 percent. 
 Finally, Table 3.9 shows the estimates on the sample of not-for-profit 
agencies. The exponentiated coefficient on the law change variable is never 
statistically significant. Moreover, in this case the estimates of the exponentiated 
coefficient on the law change variable obtained assuming the Weibull model suggest 
that a decline in reimbursement of one visit per user decreases the hazard, a result that 
is rather counterintuitive. On the contrary, the exponetiated coefficient on the law 
change variable obtained using the piece-wise constant Exponential model suggests 
that moving from the value of the variable visitsperpatient94 for the median provider 
to the value of the variable visitsperpatient94 for the provider in the 75th percentile 
in 1994 (See Table 3.3, column 4) for this sample, i.e. a decline in reimbursement of 
2.6 visits per user increases the hazard by 3.9 (using the estimate in Column 4 of 
Table 3.9) or 5.2 percent (using the estimate in Column 5 of Table 3.9). The more 
                                                




conservative estimate obtained by using the distribution of the variable 
visitsperpatient94 in 2000 suggests that moving from the value of the variable 
visitsperpatient94 for the median provider to the value of the variable 
visitsperpatient94 for the provider in the 75th percentile (column 4 of Table 3.4), i.e. 
a decline in reimbursement of 1.55 visits per user, increases the hazard by 2.38 
percent using the estimate in column 3 of Table 3.9 or 3.2 percent using the estimate 
in column 4 of Table 3.9. 
 Moreover, for this sample, a closer look at the estimates of the exponentiated 
coefficients for the dummies suggest that, relative to the excluded category, the 
dummy in period 1, the hazard increases until the third period, declines in the forth 
period (the year of the policy change) and increases again in the remaining periods. 
Because the hazard increases, decreases and increases again, for this sample the 
Weibull model does not seem particularly appropriate. 
 
3.9  Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 In this chapter, I have used a policy change to study the exit patterns of home 
health care agencies by using a novel dataset provided by the OSHPD in California.  
  I have estimated the impact of the introduction of limits in reimbursement on 
exit for both for-profit and not-for-profit home health agencies. When using the 
piece-wise-constant Exponential model, my results show statistically significant 
responses of all providers to government reimbursement behavior. However, when 
conducting the analysis separately for for-profit and not-for-profit agencies, for-profit 




 This chapter represents the first preliminary step of a larger research project 
that will examine the differences between for-profit and not-for-profit home health 
care agencies. In particular, two lines of research may be worthwhile to pursue. First, 
I would like to test the theory advanced by Arrow (1963) that suggests that  
not-for-profit firms place a higher weight on patients health than for-profit entities. 
Previous theoretical work by McKnight (2004) has formally modeled that the policy 
change studied in this dissertation created the incentive for home health agencies to 
treat only the acute patients and to dump the long term care patients who became less 
profitable to treat after the implementation of the Interim Payment System. In the 
contest of the policy change studied here, Arrows theory leads to the testable 
prediction that not-for profit home health care agencies would be less likely to 
decrease their fraction of long term care patients compared to their acute care ones 
than for profit agencies.   
 In addition to this line of research, I plan to further employ the novel 
definition of market that I proposed in this chapter by exploiting the role of 
competition within each market to study differences in exit behavior and services 
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Table 3.1 Persons Served by Medicare Home Health Care and Visits per Person Served 
in the United States as a Whole and in California 
 United States California 










1996 108 74 111 52 
1997 109 73 110 49 
1998 96 51 97 36 
1999 86 42 88 31 
2000 74 37 75 29 



















Table 3.2 Medicare Visits  
Year Number of Medicare Home Care visits received by 
Medicare Beneficiaries 
(From Statistical Supplement) as a percentage of the 
Number of visits provided for which Medicare is the 
































                                            Table 3.3 
Average of the Variable Visitsperpatient94 at Different Percentiles  
               
Columns 2 3 and 4 display the distribution of the variable visitsperpatient94 for the agencies 
in the market in 1994 for year 1994. The last 2 columns display the distribution of the 
variable visitsperpatient94 for non respondents and for agencies that closed in any given year. 
                                         
 
Table 3.4 
Average of the Variable Visitsperpatient94 at Different Percentiles for Different  
Sub-Samples for Year 2000        






















1% 3.16 1.4 7.42 1.17 3.5 
5% 8.49 8 12 8.04 8.04 
10% 12.8 11.9 16.47 12.94 12.3 
25% 21.52 21 21.76 22.43 23.65 
50% 33.37 42 29.38 39.87 44.04 
75% 53.79 64.26 39.8 74.06 65.58 
90% 74.06 78.96 50.3 91.66 74.62 
95% 83.99 99.11 64.96 107.42 88.94 
99% 148.12 166.54 90.37 190.69 149.80 
percentiles            entire 
sample 
for profit not-for-profit 
1% 2.93 1.4 8.77 
5% 10.32 5.7 12.59 
10% 12.38 11.83 16.16 
25% 20.77 19.77 21.56 
50% 30.47 35.09 28.48 
75% 45.19 56.75 34.7 
90% 64.26 74.53 46.31 
95% 74.53 88.94 52.06 





                                                         Table 3.5 
                                        Outcome is non Respondent  
Post* Number of visits 









Post Yes Yes Yes 
Year first licensed 
dummies 
No Yes Yes 
Market dummies No No No 



































For each year, every cell displays the following figure: Nis/N, where Nis is the number of 








Market    For Profit Not-for-Profit For Profit Not-for-Profit 
Bakersfield 0.88 0.66 1.46 0.36 
Chico-Paradise 0.66 0.44 0.73 0.73 
Los Angeles, Long-Beach 5.27 1.98 4.38 1.82 
Mercedes 0.44 0 0.36 0.36 
Modesto 0.66 0.66 0.73 0.36 
Oakland, Alameda, 
Contra Costa 
1.76 1.32 2.19 1.46 
Orange County 1.1 0.44 0.73 0 
Redding 0.22 0.22 0.36 0.36 
Riverside, San Bernardino 1.1 1.1 1.82 0.73 
Sacramento, El Dorado, 
Placer 
2.64 0.88 2.55 1.09 
Salinas 0.22 0.44 0 0.36 
San Diego 2.64 1.76 2.9 1.82 
San Francisco, Marin, San 
Mateo 
1.54 1.98 1.09 2.55 
San Jose 0.66 0.66 1.82 0.36 
San-Luis Obispo- 
Atascadero-Paso Robles 
0.22 0.22 0.36 0 
Santa Barbara, Santa Maria, 
Lompoc 
0.22 0.88 0.36 0.73 
Santa Cruz, Watsonville 0.22 0.88 0.36 0.36 
Santa Rosa 0.66 0.22 0.36 0 
Stockton, Lodi 1.32 0.66 0.73 1.09 
Fresno, Madera 1.32 1.32 0.73 1.46 
Vallejo, Fairfield, Napa 0.22 0.44 0.72 0.73 
Ventura 0.66 0.33 0.74 0.36 
Visalia, Tulare, Porterville 0.88 0.22 0.36 0.36 
Yolo 0.22 0.44 0 0.36 
Yuba City, Sutter 0.66 0 0 0 
Rural 34.2 21.5 31.6 24.53 




Table 3.7: Entire Sample, Log Relative Hazard Form 
 
*The law change variable is equal to 0 for the first three periods and it is equal to 
visitsperpatients94 for the remaining 4 periods. The symbols ** and *** mean statistically 


































Year first licensed 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market dummies No Yes No Yes 

























Number of Failures 278 278 278 278 




  Table 3.8: For-Profit Log Relative Hazard Form 
 
*The law change variable is equal to 0 for the first three periods and it is equal to 
visitsperpatients94 for the remaining 4 periods. The symbols ** and *** mean statistically 























 Weibull Piece-wise constant-
Exponential 








Year first licensed 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market dummies No Yes No Yes 












d5 - - 5.289998*** 
( 1.946381) 
  5.9559*** 
(2.291813) 








Number of Failures 190 190 190 190 





Table 3.9: Not-for-Profit Log Relative Hazard Form 
 
 
*The law change variable is equal to 0 for the first three periods and it is equal to 







 Weibull Piece-wise constant-
Exponential 
Law change variable* .9854864 
(.0077918) 






Year first licensed 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market dummies No Yes No Yes 
























Number of Failures 88 88 88 88 





Chapter 4:  Conclusion 
 
 
Demographic trends that shape modern economies make the financing of 
long-term care an increasingly important issue. On the one hand, the proportion of 
elderly people is increasing in most of the developed world and families are 
becoming smaller and smaller, causing the pool of potential caregivers to shrink. On 
the other hand, governments facing skyrocketing health care costs are being forced to 
adopt pricing policies aimed at minimizing expenditures. 
 This dissertation evaluates the impact of a pricing scheme that imposes a limit 
on the reimbursement of home health care, a form of long term care that has become 
increasingly popular in many countries.  
 In the first essay, I show that imposing limits in reimbursement for home 
health care services has effects that go well beyond the health care sector, affecting 
transfers in the form of changed living arrangements for the elderly and their 
caregivers. 
 In the second essay, I examine the impact of the imposition of limits in 
reimbursement on exit behavior of home health care providers. Home health care 
agencies are providers with very low entry barriers and very few assets, and the 
majority of their revenues come from public sources. These characteristics make them 
likely to be particularly responsive to any reimbursement change.  I show that home 
health care agencies respond very quickly to changes in the profitability of home 




 There are still many important issues that need to be addressed. First, a 
restriction on government reimbursement of home health care services can affect the 
labor supply of informal caregivers. Therefore, future research should try to identify 
whether there is a direct link between the public provision of home health care 
services and labor supply of caregivers. 
 Second, since people that require care generally prefer to be taken care of by 
women (OSHPD, 2005) and most care giving does not require skilled labor, changes 
in the public provision of long term care services may imply changes in labor market 
opportunities for unskilled women relative to unskilled men. Therefore, it will be 
interesting to investigate whether changes in the public provision of long term care 
services have an impact on the labor force participation and hours of work of 
unskilled women compared to unskilled men. 
 Additionally, it seems worthwhile investigating the impacts of the changing 
age structure of care givers. According to Smith (1997), between 1966 and 1996 the 
fraction of the oldest old (people 85 years of age or older) in the population has 
increased by 300 percent compared to an increase of 104 percent in the fraction of 
people at least 65 years old. This increase in the fraction of the oldest elderly suggests 
that the children of the oldest elderly, the most likely caregivers, are elderly as well. 
The literature on care giving has looked at the impact of informal care giving on the 
health of the caregivers, finding that care giving has an adverse effect on the health of 
the caregiver (Witlatch, Feinberg and Sebesta, 1997; Whitlach, Feinberg and Stevens, 




heterogeneous, i.e. it is more pronounced for the group of elderly who take care of the 
oldest old. 
 Another research topic for the future research agenda focuses on the cost 
effectiveness of home improvement interventions aimed at keeping the elderly in the 
community. For example, investments aimed at modifying the homes of the elderly to 
make them more suitable for people with impaired mobility might be a relevant 
channel for the prevention of falls, a common cause of hospitalization and long term 
care use among the elderly (OECD, 2005,b). 
 Finally, further work is needed to identify differences in behavior by 
ownership type of home health care agencies on other outcomes such as the patients 
agency selection, charity care, and staffing both in the United States as well as in 



















This appendix motivates the use of the average number of visits per user as an 
appropriate measure of cost to construct the cross state measure of restrictiveness 
used in the empirical framework in chapter 1. Another possible measure to use is the 
Medicare payment per user in 1994. I have access to this measure at the state and 
census division level. 
  However, Medicare payments, included the per patient limit cap, are adjusted 
across different localities to take into account the different wages existing in different 
areas. The areas used for adjustment purposes are defined by the Medicare program 
and do not correspond to standard geographic classifications68. So, for example, 2 
areas can have a high per patient cost in 1994 in dollar terms for two distinct reasons 
(or a combination of the two): either wages are high or the number of visits provided 
is high. In the first case, the blended per patient limit is adjusted upward to take into 
account the high wages, but it is not adjusted in the second case. I cannot adjust the 
per -patient cap, because I have only data aggregated at the state level. 
 As a consequence, if I were to use a restrictiveness measure in dollar terms 
like the following, 
Rsc=Per patient $ cost of providing the services in 1994 in state s- Per patient $ cost of 
providing the services in 1994 in state s census division, 
                                                
68 For a more in depth illustration of the areas as well as the adjustment factors see, for example, 




I would introduce measurement error in the cross state measure. In fact, without being 
able to adjust for wage levels, the restrictiveness measure could look the same for 2 
states that after the adjustment could actually face a very different cap. Because of 
this, the number of visits gives a measure that captures use across states and therefore, 

















Appendix II: National Health Interview Survey Data 
 
 National Health Interview Survey did not ask a specific question on home 
health care for years before 1997. Since 1997 questions on home care have been 
asked in the person level file and the sample adult file (composed of a randomly 
selected adult in respondent households). 
In the sample adult file respondents are asked whether they received home from a 
nurse or other health care professional in the previous 12 months, while in the person 
level file respondents are asked whether they received care at home from a nurse or 
other health care professional during 2 reference weeks in the previous 12 months. 
 Because the question asked in the sample adult file seemed more 
comprehensive and less subject to measurement error, in section 2.5.3 I use the 
sample adult file to identify the weighted fractions of Medicare only elderly and 
Medicaid Medicare dually eligible beneficiaries that received home health care in 
the previous 12 months. I recovered from the person level file the information on 
health insurance and I merged the person level files health insurance data with the 
adult file data by using the household, family and the person Identification numbers 










Table A1: Estimation Results, 65+ Pooled Sample, Outcome is Was Covered by 




















































- - Yes Yes 
less than high school - - - .108** 
(.011) 
high school - - - .019** 
(.002) 
some college - - - -.0003 
(.003) 
Observations 233864 233864 233864 233864 
    *,**: significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Restrictivenesssc=As-Ac where As is the average number 
of Medicare home care visits per user in state s in 1994 and Ac is the average number of Medicare home care visits 
per user in states census division c. State and year dummies are included in every specification. Standard errors are 
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